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Between Worlds, Between Times: Thinking with Trans Narratives at the
Limits of Ontology and Temporality
Abstract
My thesis offers up an explicitly transfeminist mobilization of the theoretical notions of
ontological pluralism and queer temporality against the pervasive cultural norm of cisnormativity and the dominant temporal logic of chrono-normativity. First, I critique the blatantly
transphobic and fallacious rhetoric of Kathleen Stock, the face of the “gender critical” feminist
movement in the UK, which I contextualize as part of a contemporary resurgence of the hateful
legacy of trans-exclusion rooted in the second wave feminist movement of the ‘60s and ‘70s and
cemented in academic theory by Janice Raymond’s (1979) Transsexual Empire. I then delve
deeper, aiming to expose a subtle and under interrogated trend of transphobia and trans-resistant
presuppositions endemic to Anglo-American and French feminist philosophy through an
extended engagement with the work and thought of Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler. Next I trace
an evolution of philosophical treatments of the notions of ontology and temporality, from the
early groundbreaking interventions of Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger in the historically
masculinist continental philosophical tradition, to the contemporary notions of ontological
pluralism and queer temporalities. Finally, I engage in an affirmatively critical analysis of a
selection of autoethnographic and autobiographical accounts of transsexual femininity and
transfeminine transitioning. Ultimately I argue that the embracement of diverse and even
seemingly conflictual narratives of gendered existence, including both transsexual narratives and
narratives of gender variance or nonconformity – a possibility predicated on broadened and
radically inclusive understandings of ontology and temporality – is crucial to both the theoretical
goal of expanding and transforming hegemonic cultural understandings of gender in relation to
personal identity, and to the political aim of fostering equitable and just conditions for persons
who occupy nonhegemonic subject positions – specifically trans and nonbinary identities – in
society.

Keywords
Feminist Philosophy, Feminist Phenomenology, Ontological Pluralism, Queer Temporality,
Queer Theory, Transfeminism, Transgender Studies
i

Summary for Lay Audience
In my thesis I contend that the eradication of societal trans-resistance and transphobia depends in
part upon embracing narratives of gendered experience which may depart from or conflict with
conventional temporal and ontological norms. I start by exploring how the concepts of
temporality (time) and ontology (the study of existence) have been dealt with in the history of
philosophy in order to show how current avenues of thought in the academic domains of queer
theory and transgender studies can build on and amend early philosophical approaches to
thinking about the human experience in new and productive ways. Specifically, I emphasize how
the work and thought of current queer and trans theorists is paving a path toward more inclusive
and less “normative” ways of understanding and conceptualizing how human beings exist,
ontologically and temporally, as gendered beings with distinct and equally valid ways of selfidentifying (i.e. “gender identities”).
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1

Chapter One: Introduction: Gender and Subjectivity

1.1

Acknowledgment of Positionality

A desideratum of theoretical investigations of gender carried out by cisgender scholars or
theorists is that they refrain from the presumption of “an insider’s view” (Lugones, 1990, p.
234)1. Engagement with trans self-narratives is unequivocally imperative to the avoidance of
perpetuating the material harms which can result from the uncritical tendency to construe trans
subjects as “purely manifestations of discourse” (Hayward, 2011, p. 234). Each of the major
spheres of mainstream discourse have historically been complicit – formally and informally,
directly and indirectly – in perpetrating a widespread, systematic assault on transness which has
entailed the virtually ubiquitous exclusion and derision of trans identity and, correspondingly, the
near total elision of lived trans experience, from every aspect of social, cultural, and political life.
As a consequence, trans people, particularly trans women, have long been subjected to
various harmful and degrading stereotypes and false characterizations. In mainstream society,
popular culture, and the fields of medicine and psychiatry, transness has been conflated with
psychological and bodily abnormality, associated with self-deception or delusionality, and
thought to imply sexual deviance or “inversion.”2 Trans women have been labeled as
“deceivers,”3 depicted in film and television as mentally ill or psychotic4, and even viewed as

The basic dichotomy between “insiders” and “outsiders” will henceforth be a recurring theme and will
serve to scaffold its central political demand that trans femininity be recognized universally and
unconditionally in all areas of life as a valid subject position worthy of celebration and recognition in
equal measure to its hegemonic and normative counterpart: the subject position of cisgender femininity.
Moreover, I employ the notion of ontological pluralism to justify the major theoretical claim of the thesis
that ostensibly disparate, mutually conflicting narrative models of gender can harmoniously coexist
within both mainstream “worlds” and “worlds” outside the mainstream.
2
See Richard Von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis (New York: Physicians and Surgeons Book
Company, 1935); Havelock Ellis, Psychology of Sex: A Manual for Students (London: Heinemann
Medical Books, 1948).
3
See Bettcher (2007).
4
See Dry (2020).
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dangerous, despite the documented reality that trans women themselves, particularly Black trans
women, face an extremely disproportionate rate of fatal violence at the hands of a transphobic
and trans-resistant public.5 In the recent history of feminist thought itself, trans women have been
deliberately misgendered, accused of inauthenticity, and denied a prominent place within debates
and discussions concerning women in general. In a particularly heinous show of transphobic
prejudice, Janice Raymond (1979) attempts to charge all trans women with defiling the very
symbolic image of the “female body.” She famously writes, in The Transsexual Empire, that
“[a]ll transsexuals rape women’s bodies by reducing the real female form to an artifact,
appropriating this body for themselves” (Raymond, 1979, p. 104). Disappointingly,
transsexuality and gender variance have been routinely and frequently mischaracterized and
misapprehended in these and similar ways in even progressive sociopolitical, legal, and academic
discourses of both late- and post-modernity, including many current mainstream gender and
queer theoretical discourses. At the root of the problem is, arguably, the extreme degree of
cultural unintelligibility, or illegibility, associated with trans identity in the public view – which
is to say, plainly and simply, that trans women as a group are in danger of being seen as not fully
or really subjects.
In the face of this bleak reality, a vast and growing body of literature and theory also
exists under the heading of “transgender studies,” a domain of scholarship spurred on by the
early work of vanguard thinkers such as Sandy Stone, a woman whose gender identity leaves her
vulnerable to the harmful, potentially lethal, effects of systemic and interpersonal transmisogyny
and transphobia. It is my intention to engage with this body of thought in a productive and
respectful manner, and this necessitates an acknowledgment of my own gendered positionality. I
occupy a position of privilege6 in relation to gender in the sense that the relationship between my
gender identity, physical appearance, and gendered behaviour more or less aligns neatly with
culturally hegemonic conceptions of masculine gender and its veritable synonymity with male
biological sex. My experience of gender is not characterized by oppression, marginalization, or

In a 2019 press release, the American Medical Association (AMA) refers to the ongoing “violence
against the transgender community” as an “epidemic.” See AMA (2019); see also Human Rights
Campaign (2019); see also Kaur (2019).
6
“Privilege” should be understood as a purely relational term which does not imply superiority or
preferability but denotes non-opposition to a norm, in this case gender normativity, or the presence of
cisgender identity in combination with male-typical bodily appearance.
5
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discrimination on the basis of difference, real or perceived, from the norm. My performance of
gender rarely diverges from culturally established norms, and it causes me no anguish to
maintain my adherence the rigid cultural ideals of masculinity consistently at all times and across
all spheres of public and private life.
Because I am cisgender, I cannot meaningfully contribute to the important task of
conceptualizing and articulating what it is like to be, or be perceived as, gender nonconforming,
or to feel dysphoric in relation to my own gendered body, as many trans and gender
nonconforming scholars can and have. Nor do I have any insight, as a man, into what it is like to
be a woman. I can, however, highlight the work of those with personal experiences of being or
being perceived as gender nonconforming within a highly gender normative and trans-resistant
society. In practice, this means seeking out, examining, and taking seriously the work of authors
who have intimate firsthand knowledge of gender-based oppression. It also means consciously
and deliberately examining my citational practices through a political lens. These two
tendencies/policies constitute mutually integral aspects of my research methodology.
However, I am not without my biases. I approach the phenomenon of gender, and the
domain of gender theory, from the perspective of a former student of philosophy, which is to say,
with an ingrained bias towards the fetishization of reason, an enduring tendency initiated at the
dawn of the European Age of Enlightenment. But a cultural phenomenon as pervasive and
insidious as transphobia does not sustain itself on its adherence to the rules of logic, and
therefore cannot be eradicated through the use of logic alone. Thus, disproving or ‘debunking’
the logical accuracy, or ‘cogency,’ of transphobic discourse is not enough to eradicate the
transphobic sentiment that continues to plague both formal theoretical discourses and common
societal and cultural perspectives on gender and sex. Indeed, the numerous deeply held
convictions about gender and sex perpetuated by dominant discourse and dominant culture
cannot simply be eradicated on the grounds that they are technically “incorrect.”
For the deeply entrenched ideological biases regarding gender embedded in Western
culture, no matter how logically incoherent they may be, subsist primarily on the non-rational
faith of the indoctrinated who perpetuate them and the institutions that uphold them and enforce
adherence to, or conformity with, them. Accordingly, I must go further than mere rational
critique. On a theoretical level, “going further” means not only cultivating a hermeneutic of
suspicion as I navigate the realm of traditional, masculinist and male-dominated philosophical
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discourse, but also stepping outside of that realm to explore the ideas of those relegated to its
margins. It means, in my context, pushing the boundaries, conventions, traditions, and norms of
established philosophical domains, including both epistemology and ontology, to
unapologetically and unconditionally highlight trans ways of being and knowing, and
nonnormative ways of performing or subverting gender.

1.2

Initial Frameworks for Conceiving of the Subject

It is widely assumed that the act of thinking necessarily implies some form of
‘subjectivity’ or ‘I’-ness, even if it doesn’t guarantee the cohesive and fully formed ‘subject’ of
René Descartes’ (1644) cogito7. Some would go as far as to say that human thought is never not
imbued with a tacit awareness of the self. What is more, it is commonly held that the mind orders
events sequentially or temporally, hence humanity’s seemingly universal and transcultural
tendency to invest in the abstract notions of past, present, and future. Still another feature of
consciousness is that it requires a body. It is embodied. The thinking subject – the ‘I’ – inhabits
or is confined by what has come to be known in discourse as “the body,” or soma in ancient
Greek. Plato, believing the body to be a kind of prison or “tomb” for the rational soul, sought to
reason away the problem of the body by valorizing the pursuit of wisdom and the denial of
sensual pleasures, or the pleasures or appetites of the flesh.
In spite of the somatophobic legacy of privileging abstract thought over embodied
experience and Forms/Ideas over particulars8, however, the problem of embodiment persists. Not

Despite the enduring popularity of Descartes’ (1644) ‘cogito,’ I think therefore I am (Latin: cogito, ergo
sum), the famous French philosopher did not technically prove the existence a substantial self beyond a
shadow of a doubt. He does not in fact reach sufficient grounds to draw any exact conclusion regarding
the nature of the being or thing (which he calls the “I”) that he believes his “meditations” have led him to
discover. The most he can say is that there is thinking. Is he justified in going on to say that there is an I
that exists necessarily, and further, that this I is a thinking thing? In fact, one might object that the
apodictic certainty of the claim that constitutes the latter half of the cogito (“therefore I am”) is
uncritically founded. If Descartes were only to take his own method seriously, he could never have
arrived at the cogito in its self-assured entirety. That the ‘I’ exists necessarily is an unsupported
supposition that he surreptitiously smuggles into his overall claim. The most we can say is that there is
thinking, and that thinking is a feature of experience.
8
This legacy of hyper rational somatophobic thinking in the history of metaphysics, as Judith Butler
(1990; 1995) evocatively demonstrates, is closely linked to patriarchal constructions of femininity as
7
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only have many postmodern and contemporary discourses sought to unsettle the neat paradigm
of Cartesian dualism (viz. the hard and fast division between mind and body) but they have also
problematized the category of the body itself, in some cases aiming to expose the supposedly
objective medical and scientific category of “the body” as little more than a discursively
saturated fiction. Similarly, the subject of modern discourse – Man9 – has historically been the
source of much debate and disagreement, especially within the domain of feminist thought.
Subjectivity is surrounded by a host of theoretical terms: consciousness, awareness, cognition,
thinking, wisdom, knowledge, etc. But regardless of the terminological tack with which one
chooses to breach the abstract domain of subjective human existence, the concept of subjectivity
lies at the heart of the enterprise of philosophy, not as a discipline but as a way of thinking and,
indeed, living. The very notion of subjectivity has itself been central to philosophical speculation
since the time of Socrates and the pre-Socratic philosophers of ancient Greece who preceded
him. relatedly, due to the acute and unrivaled self-awareness of philosophical thought qua
philosophical thought, classical thinkers have adhered to rigorous programs of introjection and
self-reflection which often require a great deal of both mental solitude and interpersonal
isolation.
For all its self-attributions of robustness and fortitude, however, the classical
philosophical mode of thought can easily lead to solipsistic and aleatory dead ends which
threaten to preclude or obscure pressing political and ethical considerations and objectives.
Hence the interdisciplinary nature of my thesis is meant as a deliberate acknowledgment of the
aporias which have arisen out of the narrow and parochial foci of traditional ways of thinking
and knowing since antiquity. Foucault coined a neologism for discourses and ways of knowing
that have been systematically relegated to the margins of dominant discourse: “subjugated
knowledges.” In a related vein, the emergent domain of transgender studies aims to foreground
voices and narratives that have been routinely ignored in the academy while transfeminism
generally aims to put into practice anti-transphobic methods and practices of activism and
thought.

irrational and formless in contradistinction to masculinity, a category more heavily associated with
rationality and substance.
9
See Chapter One of Rosi Braidotti’s The Posthuman (2013); see also Wynter (1995).
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1.3

A Preliminary Roadmap to Thinking Beyond the Gender
Binary

Capitalism – arguably the main linchpin of Western society – sustains itself and is
predicated on a sexual division of labour whereby women's unpaid physical and emotional labor
is simultaneously relied upon and invisibilized and devalued10 while men traditionally occupy
the majority of political and economic positions of power. That many undervalued and under/unpaid, historically female-dominated forms of labor (e.g. domestic and kinship work) which have
long fueled the numerous structures of power endemic to the dominant socioeconomic paradigm
of patriarchal capitalism in the West, continue to be performed mostly by women even today
serves to perpetuate and reinforce a pervasive logic of hierarchal binary dualism which has not
only dominated Western epistemology and influenced the cosmological and metaphysical
narratives of Western philosophy for centuries but, accordingly, constitutes a guiding force in
shaping and determining the production of (asymmetrically gendered) cultural norms and the
organization of society at a fundamental level.11
Hence capitalism is obviously not just an economic paradigm. Its reach extends to the
political and social spheres, pervades the production and circulation of linguistic and cultural
norms, and, arguably, informs the very production of subjectivity in late capitalist culture.
The disproportionate relegation of domestic labour, kinship work and sex work (which is even
more pathologized and invisibilized due to the widespread cultural demonization and
invisibilization of women's sexuality and sexual autonomy/ agency which contributes to rape
culture, issues of reproductive justice and access to abortion, and the feminization of poverty)
perpetuates the systemic oppression of women as a group. Although seeking to construct more
egalitarian juridical and sociocultural paradigms is no doubt a preferable alternative to resigning
oneself to the inegalitarian status quo, proponents of “equality” between the sexes (specifically
with respect to participation in the responsibilities associated with child rearing) unwittingly
leave uninterrogated the driving force which underlies the notions of family, kinship, etc.:

10
11

See Mies (1986).
See Frye (1989).
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namely, what Lee Edelman (2004) famously identifies as “reproductive futurism.”12 Within our
dominant cultural paradigm, heterosexual reproduction is taken as an evolutionarily based
imperative, and gender roles thus understood as epiphenomenal to the static and universal
dictates of human biology.
Moreover, the cis-heterosexual paradigm upholds the cultural matrices of intelligibility
through which we deem behaviours and bodies as either normal or abnormal, acceptable or
undesirable, from the standpoint of normativity – which is taken, for all intents and purposes, to
be an objective standpoint. Biological reductionism upholds gender essentialism insofar as social
gender is taken to be coextensive with biological sex. However, the immutability of 'sex' has
been challenged and the possibility of its discursivity and malleability raised, most notably by
Butler (1993). The possibility of sex as a discursive category, and not an ontological or
biological given, cuts open dominant perspectives on gender roles and renders them vulnerable
to feminist critique. Not only can we make the epistemological argument that scientific
knowledge in general is not objective but permeated by cultural and personal bias, but we can
observe genealogically that the various subdisciplines of biology such as Endocrinology fail to
deliver truths about gender and sex and is permeated by a history of pathologization that
permeates the entire sphere of medicine. For example, the related domains of psychiatry,
sexology and psychoanalysis are three of the most obvious culprits in the contamination of
scientific or quasi-scientific data with normative heteropatriarchal values.
However, the fact that sex cannot be supported let alone proven to be a fixed or static
entity corresponding to gendered forms of behavior, leaves us in a position of radical uncertainty.
Although ideology often obscures the inherent ambiguity of what we call gender and sex (and for
many leads to an irrational refusal to accept it irrespective of its logical self-evidence), the
polysemic ambiguity of the contested terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ will be the starting point of the
present investigation. Moreover, I hold that any degree of imprecision or inaccuracy in the
external application of purportedly objective determinations of sex – which cannot be divorced
from the dominant gender terms to which they are meant to correspond – to living human bodies
is indicative of the instability of Western culture’s medicalized system of sex determination
overall – and therefore of the taxonomic system of classification and categorization to which it is

12

See Edelman (2004).
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intimately related. However, the hypothesis of fundamental ambiguity to which I subscribe is not
intended to be homogenizing or restrictive but to defend dissent from culturally established
norms and expectations around sex, gender, and sexuality. Rather I aim to defend people’s right
to identify however they choose on a spectrum ranging from the assertion of gender as a static
and unchanging aspect of one’s ontological makeup to the belief that gender is a fluid or flexible
entity influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by sociocultural and environmental factors.
Because of the legitimization, naturalization, and normalization of dominant gender positions,
argues Sharlee Cranston-Reimer (2014), “other ways of being in the world become difficult—
and in some cases, impossible—to be read or be understood as legitimate, and this
delegitimization lends itself very quickly to both pathologization and dehumanization” (p. 27).
Overall, while I do intend in part to avow gender identity as a “locus of imaginative possibility”
(Cranston-Reimer, 2014, p. 27) and freedom, it is equally my intention to affirm it as a site of
certainty, immediacy, and authoritativeness from the perspective of outsiders, and in this sense to
clarify its subservient role to the inviolable will of individual personal authority.
I adopt this position with the open intention of combatting the persistent delusion of
gender as a site of objective discoverability, which leaves nonnormative identities at the mercy
of societal and scientific norms which determine the livability and social acceptance of their
identities on the false basis of empirical verifiability. Judith Butler is right that gender requires
repetition to acquire cultural legibility, however, no similar requirement applies to the
determination of its ontological stability. The latter, I maintain, is always already implied and
guaranteed by any relevant expression of self-avowal. The ontological stability of a given
gendered subject position is automatically and immediately ensured on the basis of selfidentification alone. The burden of verifying one’s identity falls exclusively under the domain of
the subject herself who can be said to possess an ethical authority over her identity of the type
which all subjects universally possess over their identities. It is not temporally dependent on any
specific duration; rather, it is immutable if the subject says it is, and fluid if the subject says it is.
Moreover, the ontological qualities of immutability and of fluidity are not dependent on
consistency or duration; their legitimacy is no less inviolable or immediate should one choose to
shift between or traverse categories of identity (e.g. male and female) over the course of a life or,
indeed, at the very same point in time. And to be quite clear, this leaves open the possibility of
simultaneous identification with multiple categories of identity.

9

2

Identifying the Enemy: A Critique of Contemporary TransExclusionary Feminism
2.1

A Brief Primer on the Term ‘TERF’

It is no secret that the history of mainstream feminism is marred by its legacy of hostility
against trans women. During the “Second Wave” of feminism in the United States and Canada, a
period roughly demarcated from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, mainstream Anglo-American
feminisms – which, to indulge in a gross oversimplification, were divided into two camps: liberal
and radical – inexcusably displaced trans women from the fold of liberatory struggle. As a rule,
trans women’s perspectives were unjustly omitted from mainstream feminist discourse, which in
turn neglected to prioritize the pursuit of rights and protections for trans women specifically and
failed to show concern for or awareness of their dignity or humanity as women. Trans women’s
presence in women’s-only spaces and attendance at women’s events was a source of contention
and open debate, as the deployment of an array of codified propagandic rhetoric such as the
infamous “Womyn-born womyn (WBW)” policy of the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival
(MichFest)13 curtailed the possibility of trans women’s full inclusion in feminist discourse and
praxis.
With this unbearably sordid history in mind, it is more important than ever to denounce
trans-exclusionary feminism as a logically baseless and unjustifiable ideological regime
engineered to advance and serve the interests of cisgender women only. For trans-exclusionary
feminist ideology has not vanished but continues to be ardently upheld by transphobic
gatekeepers of women’s rights, some of whom occupy positions which afford them unignorable
degrees of social influence and culturally ascribed authority. In one related instance, a group of
seven British and Australian feminist philosophers co-authored a guest post in the online
interdisciplinary academic journal Daily Nous, entitled “Derogatory Language in Philosophy
Journal Risks Increased Hostility and Diminished Discussion,” which they intended to be viewed

13

See McConnell (2016).
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as a public complaint about “two papers” published in an “issue of Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research (PPR),” the contents of which supposedly indicate the publication’s
complacency in the “normalization” of the term “TERF,” which, in their words, “is at worst a
slur and at best derogatory” (Stock/Weinberg, August 27, 2018).
The first of the two papers under attack by the group of scholars for their use of the term
“TERF” is a “discussion note” on Jason Stanley’s (2015) book How Propaganda Works in the
form of a paper entitled “The Epistemology of Propaganda,” in which Canadian philosophy
professor and transgender rights activist Veronica Ivy, formerly known as Rachel McKinnon,
“[uses] Stanley’s account of propaganda to analyze a modern form of propaganda where socalled trans-exclusionary radical feminists (TERFs) are engaged in a political project to deny
that trans women are women—and thereby to exclude trans women from women-only spaces,
services, and protections” (McKinnon, 2018, p. 483).
While I have little doubt that the complainants’ motivations are nefarious, my unverified
suspicions are beside the point. In what appears to be a genuine attempt to assuage criticism by
reassuring readers of the purity of their intentions, however, the aforementioned complainants
find it necessary to clarify that their shared
concerns are not directed at transsexual women who have transitioned under medical care and
acquired a Gender Recognition Certificate. Rather, the issues are around the intent to change the
protocols for trans women to one operating on the basis of self-identification, and the way that
could make women’s sex-segregated spaces de facto inoperative (Stock/Weinberg, August 27,
2018).

Ironically, this very attempt to pre-emptively ease the potential backlash to their grievance, to
couch in explicitly in the ostensibly progressive sentiment of approval (at best) or tolerance (at
worst) of medically and legally sanctioned instantiations of transfemininity to the exclusion of all
other (unofficial or unverified) claims to womanhood, betrays a deeper and more stubborn faith
in cisnormativity as the neutral ground of gender identity. It speaks volumes to what I am
inclined to diagnose as an underlying tendency toward trans-resistance. In other words, they have
not eradicated the transphobic bias within themselves but simply replaced it with an arbitrary
belief in the necessity of official documentation in support of one’s self-avowed gender identity
– a false requirement which, it bears pointing out, is by no means mandatory for the adoption of
a cisgender identity.

11
Given that advocating for trans women’s freedom to “operate on the basis of selfidentification” is precisely a central concern at issue throughout my thesis, the disingenuous and
conditional proclamation of trans acceptance displayed in the above statement strikes me as
particularly heinous and counterproductive to the political objective of trans women’s
unconditional social inclusion and protection from unduly intrusive interrogations into the
authenticity of their feminine identity. It is statements of this type which I therefore unreservedly
seek to condemn at the same time as I delineate my theoretical assertions. Along similar lines as
my condemnation in this regard, Australian freelance writer Viv Smythe – credited with one of
the earliest recorded uses of the term “TERF”14 – writes in a blog post entitled “An apology and
a promise” (2008) that
marginalising trans women at actual risk from regularly documented abuse /violence in favour of
protecting hypothetical cis women from purely hypothetical abuse/violence from trans women in
women-only safe-spaces strikes me as horribly unethical as well as repellently callous.

2.2

Critique of Kathleen Stock

“How did it come to pass that Stock’s blog-posts should be so widely discussed in philosophy?”
(Bettcher, 2018)15

Kathleen Stock, who teaches Philosophy at the University of Sussex, has come under fire
in recent years for her views on gender identification. Stock (April 11, 2019) asserts that “neither
social nor legal transition can change facts about individual sex determination and differentiation
at a biological level.” First, it must be pointed out that it is a preposterously misguided approach
to imply, as Stock does, a relation between the rational viability of “facts” about the biological
(i.e. “chromosomal, hormonal, morphological”) basis of “sex determination” and the personal
pursuit of seeking social or legal sex transition even if one is invested in defending the
hegemonic biologico-cultural narrative regarding the static and binary nature of “sex
differentiation.”
To imply that trans people who choose to transition unitarily share a desire to “change
facts” is to enact, quite presumptuously and arbitrarily, a blanket politicization of the act of
14
15

See Smythe (2008).
See Weinberg (May 30, 2018).
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transitioning. The above quotation represents an attempt by Stock to perform a woefully
transparent sleight of hand in which she conflates the personal actions of those seeking social
recognition as members of the sex and/or gender to which they have rightfully and definitively
asserted their membership, and the (politically or theoretically motivated) desire to deconstruct
and challenge the commonly accepted narrative of a dualistic or dichotomous paradigm of sex –
a hegemonic paradigm maintained in both the social sphere, under the heading of what has in
recent years come to be known as the “gender binary,” and within the theoretical purview of
mainstream biology under the heading of a model referred to as “sexual dimorphism.” It is flatly
counter to the aim of trans liberation to attribute a desire to “change facts16” to members of a
marginalized group, namely trans people, explicitly and primarily engaged in a battle to attain
social recognition with respect to the “factuality” of their gender identities.
Yet the indignant tone in which TERFs like Stock tend to emphasize the biological
“facts” which undergird and inform their ideological ethos obscures and obfuscates not only the
relevance of such debates to the urgent issue of obtaining legal rights and protections and access
to adequate medical care for trans men and women, but also, and perhaps even more subtly and
ironically, fails to recognize the symbolic and sociocultural connotations that the very
terminological category of “sex” in the so-called biological sense, has undeniably accrued in
both the ‘common view’ or ‘natural attitude’ regarding sex in Western culture and society and
throughout the corpus of recent and modern medical, scientific, legal, political, and philosophical
discourse. This is to say, in short, that the linguistic signifier “sex” encapsulates a plethora of
conflictual symbolic and socioculturally fraught meanings which polysemically exceed and
confound the parochial specificity of its use within and in reference or allusion to the domain of
biology – a sphere powerless to restrain or circumscribe it absolutely.
At the same time as we revere the authority of biology, moreover, we blissfully cling to
societally normalized, mythically manufactured, and culturally privileged views about sex and
gender regardless of the extent to which they may prove conflictual to the very scientific
authority we appeal when, and only when, we feel threatened by the very existence of ostensibly

Any objection to an objective “fact” or “truth” about reality has the appearance of an impossible
delusion when compared to the rational-scientific will to knowledge which seeks to uncover the preexisting nature and order of phenomena in reality, and the medical and scientific discourses which inform
the common public view on such contested phenomena as biological sex are bound historically to the
paradigm of reason and scientific characterized by this very same will to knowledge.
16
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nonconforming or nonnormative modes of embodied, sexed, and gendered human being. Before
the turn of the last century, Butler gestured towards the possibility that the category of sex might
not be immune to the effects of social construction. “If the immutable character of sex is
contested,” she writes, “[then] perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as
gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction
between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all” (Butler, 1999, pp. 10-11). Though it
is by no means necessary to go as far as Butler speculatively invites us to in this passage17, the
fundamental insight that the linguistic signifier ‘sex,’ along with the phenomenon to which it
supposedly refers, is not necessarily immutable but could be susceptible, to a greater or lesser
extent, to extrinsic sociocultural influences outside of the human organism over which the
discipline of biology has historically purported to stake claim, is profoundly unignorable.
It seems, in contrast, that Stock has allowed herself to become swept up in debate over
the factuality of biological sex – the precarious basis on which the Anglo-American societal
gender binary is tenuously predicated – to the extent that her entire philosophical system (and
she is a professor of philosophy) depends upon the current moment’s dominant definition of
“biological sex” to provide an adequate framework for the conceptualization of the world in
which we live and breathe – an environment of tumultuous complexity in which things,
including perhaps our own bodies, often seem to offer endless possibilities of rediscovery and
reinvention. Stock’s facile preoccupation in this regard only serves to distract from the urgent
political issue of acquiring legal protections against transphobic discrimination and violence,
especially for trans women who are forced to endure a well-documented statistically
disproportionate onslaught of material harms as compared to cisgender women. What is more, it
prevents her from apprehending the porosity or openness of the constructed linguistic category of
‘sex’ to myriad conflictual ambiguous social and cultural influences and its ability to adapt and
transform itself in accordance with the shifting nature of both cultural and scientific norms. For
there should be nothing, I argue, preventing the formation of new attitudes and beliefs about
what constitute the essential nature of sex from altering that essential nature in a concrete and
literal sense.

17

She seems to suggest that the influences of social construction and cultural normativity on biological
science, in conjunction with the semiotic ambiguity of gender and sexual signifiers, constitute sufficient
conditions to consider the eradication of the distinction between sex and gender altogether.
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2.3

Transphobic Bias and the De-Literalization of Sex
Corporeal interiority, in this case the notion that the body has a sex, is thus indexical of the
literalizing fantasy of heterosexual melancholia, its incorporative response to the prohibition of
homosexuality. It is only via this fantasy of literalization that the body comes “to bear a sex” as
literal truth, that gender gets inscribed on the body as sex and sex appears as the literal
embodiment of gender:
The conflation of desire with the real—that is, the belief that it is the parts of the body,
the “literal” penis, the “literal” vagina, which cause pleasure and desire—is precisely the
kind of literalizing fantasy characteristic of the syndrome of melancholic heterosexuality.
The disavowed homosexuality at the base of melancholic heterosexuality reemerges as
the self-evident anatomical facticity of sex, where “sex” designates the blurred
unity of anatomy, “natural identity, “and “natural desire.” The loss is denied and
incorporated, and the genealogy of that transmutation fully forgotten and repressed. Th e
sexed surface of the body thus emerges as the necessary sign of a natural(ized) identity
and desire. The loss of homosexuality is refused and the love sustained or encrypted in
the parts of the body itself, literalized in the ostensible anatomical facticity of sex. Here
we see the general strategy of literalization as a form of forgetfulness, which, in the case
of a literalized sexual anatomy, “forgets” the imaginary and, with it, an imaginable
homosexuality. (GT 71) (Prosser, 1998, p. 64)

Stock is quite emphatic about tying the concept of literality to the category of biological
sex; she retreats into the conviction that although social transition and legal sex change are
indeed possible and undeniably becoming increasingly socially accepted practices, changing
one’s gender is a “literal” impossibility18 (April 11, 2019). In defiance of the position she
identifies disdainfully as “sex eliminationism,” Stock declares “biological sex” to be “a
politically important feature of material reality” (April 11, 2019). In spite of her excessive
paranoia about the dangerous consequences of positing the “nonexistence of material sex,”
however, she devotes little space to defining with any specificity the criteria one should possess
in order to rightfully claim ownership of a female biological sex.
Judith Butler’s seminal text “Gender Trouble’s most thorough accounting for sex as
discursive effect,” according to Jay Prosser (1998) in Second Skins: The Body Narratives of

Stock (April 11, 2019) opines that “current attempts to suppress talk of material facts about sex by
progressive institutions and academics can be read as a sympathetic attempt to bolster the fiction of actual
transition: to preserve an illusion that sex-change is literally possible.” She continues shortly thereafter to
warn, in the context of legal sex-change, that we should not “lose track of the fact that sex isn’t literally
changed.”
18
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Transsexuality, “appears in the discussion of melancholia in the second chapter, ‘Prohibition,
Psychoanalysis, and the Production of the Heterosexual Matrix’ (GT 35–78)” (p. 55). In
Prosser’s (1998) view, the second chapter of Gender Trouble showcases the text’s undeniable
primary achievement: a “thorough accounting for the construction of sex via a thorough
accounting of the construction of heterosexuality” (p. 57). In it, Butler “begins to account for the
construction of sex, that is how sex is ‘gender all along,’” by “turning to Freud’s writings on
melancholia and incorporation” (Prosser, 1998, p. 59). According to Prosser (1998), Butler
“[grounds her description of heterosexual sexing through melancholia] on a misrecognition, a
mistaking of the signifier of gender for the referent of sex, of the metaphorical for the literal” (p.
65). “For transsexual embodiment,” he continues,
Butler’s harnessing psychoanalytic discussions of melancholia and incorporation to the processes
of gendering has two interdependent significant effects: it refigures sex from material corporeality
into phantasized surface; and through this it reinscribes the opposition between queer and
heterosexual already at work in Gender Trouble, sustaining it by once again enlisting transgender
as queer (Prosser, 1998, p. 67).

In short, Prosser (1998) argues that Butler enacts a “deliteralization” of sex (p. 74).
Thus, it might appear that Stock is in fact right to ignore Butler on the basis that the latter
wrongfully and unjustifiably discounts the concrete materiality of sex. But even if this is the
case, believing in the literality of sex does not have to be a trans-exclusionary position. And this
is where Stock exposes her unforgivable bias against trans-bodies in favor of cisgender
embodiment. The materiality of sex is by no means the exclusive domain of cisgender sexed
subjects and should not be considered as such; rather, sex, even when defined strictly in a
material-biological sense, is an equally crucial aspect of transsexual bodily inhabitance and
embodied processes of transsexual becoming. Hence the surgical reconstruction of genitalia or
the therapeutic replacement of male- or female-typical hormones can easily be viewed as
naturally compatible with a radically materialist conception of sexual embodiment, provided that
one is careful to avoid the trap of conflating the literal fleshly materiality of multiplicitously
sexed corporeal bodies with a cisnormative model of sexed materiality. And this is precisely
what radical feminism and “gender critical” feminism fail to do.
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2.4

Trans-Exclusionary Anti-Essentialism

Before moving on, I would like to focus briefly on the anti-essentialist aspect of Stock’s
position. While I believe Stock’s arguments to be misguided and the hesitancy or refusal of her
and her peers and supporters to embrace or advocate for trans women’s rights and freedoms
inexcusable, her non-essentialist outlook of sex is one point on which we do not disagree.
Interestingly, Stock’s rejection of essentialism stems directly from her acknowledgment that
“information about people with Differences of Sex Development (‘DSDs’, sometimes also called
‘intersex’) challenges what’s traditionally considered standard for the categories of ‘male’ and
‘female.’” Relatedly, in 2019, Stock collaborated with a group of self-described “gender-critical
and radical feminist academic philosophers,” to co-author an open letter in which they set out to
“challenge their opponents to avoid some obviously bad argumentative moves” (Stock, May 23,
2019)19. In the third section of their blog post, labelled “questions for our opponents,” the authors
make the following appeal:
If you think that the existence of people with Differences of Sexual Development (sometimes
“disorders of sexual development” or “intersex”) shows something about whether trans women are
literally women, what is it? Please lay this out clearly, in stages, with no skipping (Stock, May 23,
2019).

To form a productive reply to this vague and unspecific question, we should be clear in
acknowledging from the outset that it is by no means a logical necessity that the existence of
variability itself, specifically the presence of diversity in the biological processes of sex
development, be seen as disproving or discounting the general rule/norm governing the
distribution of sexed characteristics in human beings, namely that they can be seen to be
distributed in a binaristic fashion20.
At first glance, the lack of sufficient grounds for the necessary abandonment or
condemnation of the law/norm popularly known as the “gender binary” might seem to render
Stock’s overall argument condonable. Upon closer inspection, however, the possibility is
This band of self-styled “radical feminists and gender-critical philosophers” include Sophie Allen, Jane
Clare Jones, Holly Lawford-Smith, Mary Leng, Rebecca Reilly-Cooper, and Kathleen Stock. See Stock
(May 23, 2019).
20
This naturally leads to the construction of coextensively binary categories of male and female as well as
the hypothesis that these two sexes pre-exist their discovery by way of scientific observation and
subsequent linguistic signification.
19

17
revealed that perhaps the binary quality of the rule/norm was only ever a provisional hypothesis
in the first place. Perhaps the attribution of an inherently or necessarily binary quality to the
category of ‘sex’ – which can never be reduced to a ‘purely’ empirical-biological category but is
also permeated by sociocultural, symbolic, linguistic or semiotic, disciplinary, and historical
influences– is not strictly necessary, thus throwing into question the rigidly binary manner in
which the category of ‘sex’ is formulated by, as well as perceived through the lenses of, both
mainstream culture and biological science. Perhaps the binaristic quality of sex is less rigorously
justifiable and more arbitrary than we first assumed. This does not obligate us to do away with
the category of biological sex, but shows us that we are free, as it were, to do with it as we please
– to expand and modify it as we see fit in accordance not only with potential advancements in the
biological study of human bodies but also and equally in accordance with the evolution of social,
political, and cultural norms and values.
But it is evident that, for Stock and her colleagues, “literal” womanhood, which for them
resides firmly in the register of “biological sex,” occupies a more primal and superior status in
relation to what we might call sociosymbolic womanhood or femininity. Because it is the
possession of biological femaleness which affords one (or precludes one from attaining) a
feminine social status (i.e. the social right to be recognized as a woman), biology thereby also
indirectly, but quite literally, presides over the arena of gendered social relations, including the
abstract and nonliteral realm of sociolinguistic identification. While it is by all means reasonable
and unproblematic to point out that the materiality and literality of sex can be distinguished from
the social category of gender, the further insistence by so-called “gender-critical” feminists, that
literal/material sex exerts a clear and undeniable causally determinative effect on the politically
and socially oriented category of gender, does not follow necessarily from that initial premise by
any stretch.
American social psychologist Suzanne Kessler (1998) was among the first scholars to
elucidate the indeterminacy inherent to medical constructions of gender, exposing the impact of
personal and cultural biases on physicians’ determinations of “biological sex.” The presence of
implicit bias, she argues, guides and shapes their official “recommendations” regarding the
correct or appropriate course of action to be taken when the ambiguity of an infant’s outward sex
characteristics becomes the source of parental uncertainty or anxiety. In her book Lessons from
the Intersexed, she explains that “members of medical teams have standard practices for
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managing intersexuality, which rely ultimately on cultural understandings of gender” (Kessler,
1998, p. 12).
When Kessler conducted interviews of six medical experts in the field of pediatric
intersexuality in 1985, she discovered that the “management of intersex cases [was] based upon a
theory of gender” developed by John Money and Anke A. Ehrhardt which “argues that gender
identity is changeable until approximately eighteen months of age” (1998, p. 14). “To use the
Pygmalion allegory,” write Money and Ehrhardt, “one may begin with the same clay and fashion
a god or a goddess” (Kessler, 1998, p. 14). Money’s theory that “gender and children are
malleable” and “psychology and medicine are the tools used to transform them” (Kessler, 1998,
p. 15) – which contributed heavily to the formation of the current dominant epidemiological
wisdom in the management of intersex births – constitutes what can be called an “interactionist”
model of gender in which biological, psychological, and social factors contribute to gender
development.21 According to our author, in the determination of “chromosomal and hormonal
gender, which is typically taken to be the real, natural, biological gender, usually referred to as
‘sex,’” a practice enabled by technological advancements in late twentieth century medicalscientific practice, “biological factors are often preempted in physicians’ deliberations by such
cultural factors as the ‘correct’ length of the penis and capacity of the vagina” (Kessler, 1998, p.
12). Similarly, she estimates that for Money and his colleagues, the “male” sex defined less “by
the genetic condition of having one Y and one X chromosome or by the production of sperm
[than] by the aesthetic condition of having an “appropriately” sized penis” (Kessler, 1998, p. 19).
One physician interviewed by Kessler candidly and tellingly remarks, “Why do we do all these
tests if in the end we’re going to make the decision simply on the basis of the appearance of the
genitalia?” (Kessler, 1998, p. 20).
Sex, for Stock (April 11, 2019), is “determined by possession of most or all of a cluster of
particular designated properties—chromosomal, gametic, hormonal and morphological—
produced via endogenous biological processes.” Conceding that “there is no hard and fast
21

Incidentally, this model presciently prefigures the biopsychosocial approach to psychology first
proposed by George Engel (1977) which, in contradistinction to the biomedical model of disease,
considers the complex interaction between “the social, psychological, and behavioural dimensions” of
illness and health (Borrell-Carrió, Suchman, & Epstein, 2004). Thus, the biopsychosocial model enabled
researchers to acknowledge explicitly the ways in which medicalized phenomena “are affected by
multiple levels of organization, from the societal to the molecular” (Borrell-Carrió, Suchman, & Epstein,
2004). See Wade & Halligan (2017).
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“essence” to biological sex, at least in our everyday sense: no set of characteristics a male or
female must have, to count as such,” she nevertheless contends that “competent non-essentialists
don’t think it follows from this that there are no real constraints on what counts as sex” (Stock,
April 11, 2019). Rather, she defines sex as a “cluster concept,” leading her to depict the
“possession of most or all of” a set of unnamed properties as the sole criterion for the
determination of a male or female sex. In a short article entitled “Can You Change Your
Gender?” published in the 2019 Summer edition of The Philosopher, she clarifies in slightly
different terms her position that “maleness and femaleness are two clusters of non-essential
characteristics”. In this article, the properties or characteristics (again left unnamed) to which she
ascribes the capacity to dictate sex, fall within the purview of the “chromosomal, gonadal,
genital, [and] hormonal” aspects of human physiology specifically (Stock, July 25, 2019). In her
view,
The majority of people have all of the characteristics in one cluster or other; a smaller proportion
of people have most or many of the characteristics in one cluster or other, but not all of them. So,
for instance, you don’t need to possess all of the “female” sex characteristics to count as female.
However, you do still need to possess some of them. This is a real, material condition upon sexcategory-membership (Stock, July 25, 2019).

Since no insurmountable barrier exists preventing trans women from obtaining and possessing
numerous of the so-called “properties” or “characteristics” typically associated with biological
femininity, no aspect of the above definition precludes the inclusion of trans women under the
purview of biological femininity. Stock’s efforts to debunk what she views as the propagandic
doctrine of “sex eliminationism” and to defend the “literal” existence of material sex makes her
seem paranoiac of some conspiratorial consensus among trans and gender variant individuals,
unanimously or by majority, minimally to portray sex as immaterial or non-literal, and
maximally to dissolve the category of sex entirely. She fails to realize, however, that the
possibility of changing one’s sex, both literally and conceptually, by no means implies the
demise of sex as a meaningful category; cross-sex identification does not imply the
“nonexistence” of biological sex but simply entails that its definition should not pose barriers to
the social inclusion of trans-bodies and trans people, specifically trans women. It is plainly
evident, however, that Stock’s trans-resistant interpretation of biological sex openly threatens
trans women’s access to social acceptance and medical care.
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Moreover, it is not remotely justifiable to imply, as she appears to, that transsexual
women and trans allies uniformly wish to draw a singular hard and fast “conclusion about the
nonexistence of material sex.” Many transsexual women do not seek to deny or downplay the
existence of the visible sex characteristics which differentiate female bodies from male bodies
but seek, on the contrary, to thoroughly embody a version of femininity and/or femaleness that
exists in direct contrast to masculinity and/or maleness in both a social and biological sense.
Such a pursuit is often accomplished, moreover, not by rejecting but by affirmatively enacting
one’s conformity to feminized behavioural norms and modes of gender presentation, sometimes
with the aid of surgical or hormonal aids. The variable and variegated practices of behavioural
and bodily modification, maintenance, presentation, and performance involved in sexual
transitioning and trans-becoming are not the exclusive domain of trans people, but are activities
in which most, if not all human beings find themselves constantly and actively engaged, albeit
with vastly different degrees of both visibility and volitionality in relation to social norms and
standards of intelligibility, acceptability, and propriety. These various practices involved in the
ongoing project of being/becoming22, for example, a woman, do not inherently privilege cis
subjects over trans subjects.
Over and against the divisive rhetoric of trans-exclusionary feminism, I insist that there
is nothing of substance that separates trans women from their cisgender sisters on an ontological
level.23 To defend this claim, we must, of course, resist the antecedent assumption that ontology
is inextricably, deterministically linked to both biology and psychology in the sense that would
imply a necessary correlation between (one’s) ontological status and (their) biological or
psychological makeup. And in order to be successful in that endeavour – that act of resistance to
the status quo regarding gender in society – we would do well to examine and interrogate the
conventional ways that “gender nonconformity” is described and diagnosed by the medical
professionals and scholars who safeguard hegemonic conceptions of (psycho-physiologically)

22

Being and becoming can be seen as virtually synonymous in the context of gendered existence
inasmuch as each of us, cis and trans men and women alike, are constantly locked in a processual state of
becoming-with our gender, and realizing our gendered selves in relation to a gendered ideal, whether that
ideal be cultural, personal, or as it often is, both.
23
This in no way discounts the quantitative fact that trans women face disproportionate levels of violence
and discrimination in comparison to cis women.
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‘normal’ or ‘natural’ gendered existence and experience in relation to those with the potential to
be deemed ‘abnormal’ or ‘disordered.’
Importantly, one such descriptive/diagnostic term is the highly clinicalized and
depersonalized condition of so-called psychological ‘dysphoria’ outlined in the DSM-5.24 The
term, and the notion of, ‘dysphoria’ occupies a central role in the determination and classification
of gender variance or nonconformity, and particularly affects trans people seeking to gain access
to the medical means to transition or to obtain legal documentation that aligns with who they are
and the way in which they identify.
Although dysphoria is not a necessary or universal feature of being-a-woman but does
appear to be a unique feature of transfeminine experience for certain trans women, it is also not a
necessary precondition for being a trans woman. It should therefore go without saying that is not
necessary for a trans women to claim affinity with the notion of dysphoria to be considered
women. Stock, however, states categorically that “[m]ost trans women, trans men and so-called
non-binary people have, in response to feelings of dysphoria, made the decision to live as the
opposite sex” (2019). To be complicit, as Stock is, in perpetuating without exception or
qualification the natural attitude that trans women are or must be dysphoric by virtue of their
transness, is to erroneously and stereotypically distanciate trans femininity from cis femininity.
Whereas Stock hastily and uncritically presupposes the ascendancy of the dominant
medical-psychiatric model of gender, trans women’s relationships to the clinicalized category of
dysphoria in reality can, of course, be far more complex and various. Yet this is precisely the
narrative implicit, and often explicit, in mainstream medical scientific literature, which has not
only served as the most ‘official,’ objective, authoritative discourse on the subject of gender and
sex in society throughout modern history but also intimately informs our cultural and societal
laws and norms and the practices procedures of their enforcement, both juridical and extrajuridical (i.e. what is often classified in sociological parlance as “gender policing”). In reality,
‘dysphoria’ is a condition experienced by some women – women who may personally identify as
trans or be categorized as trans by the systems/institutions that grant trans women access to

“In adolescents and adults,” the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) states,
“gender dysphoria involves a difference between one’s experienced/expressed gender and assigned
gender, and significant distress or problems functioning.” It is diagnosed on the basis of at least two of six
criteria, the first of which being “[a] marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender
and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics” (American Psychiatric Association, 2016).
24
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medical care and social support – whose intrinsic femininity, female nature, or womanhood,
should never be in question but should be viewed as always already certain and immutable (so
long as they avow it as such) in precisely the same way as it is in cis women.
With that said, it is relevant to emphasize that transsexual women’s participation in
conventional, normativized and naturalized practices of gender presentation and performance can
actually serve to reinforce the very binary model that Stock and others ironically claim is under
threat by the existence of queer and trans people, whom she/they falsely subsumes into a
homogenous group, thus failing to grasp, for example, the many palpable commonalities
between trans and cis women who share a common belief in and desire to preserve and conform
to a specific, culturally prescribed model of femininity which corresponds to the
dominant/hegemonic social categorization system of 'gender binarism.'
While trans-exclusionary radical feminists (TERFs) attempt to drive an ontological
wedge between cis and trans femininity, their efforts will always be in vain. At some point the
esteemed proponents of TERFism must emerge from the depths of their delusional and
delimiting conception of sex and gender to face the reality that no tangible or intangible border
or boundary between cis- and trans-femininity pre-exists their efforts to locate one. Refusing to
abandon their evangelistic crusade against trans women, TERFs inevitably come up empty
handed after each futile attempt at justifying their arbitrary and absurd hostility and exclusionary
sentiment. They fail at every turn, and will continue to do so, to ground their divisive hatred in
logic or biology or psychology or sociology. Even if, and when, authority figures in the fields of
medicine, biology, philosophy, and so on purport to grant legitimizing power to the false
ideology of trans exclusionary radical feminism, logic itself is not on their side; empiricism itself
is not on their side; the concrete material effects of social constructivism on bodies and
subjectivities does not conform or correspond to such a distorted model of social reality as the
one peddled by the agents and structures of normativity.

2.5

Critique of Meghan Murphy

“Only a tiny number of ideologues believe that Murphy’s opinions are transphobic rather than
female-defensive” (Kay, 2019, National Post)

23
Meghan Murphy is a Canadian writer and journalist who, like Stock in the UK, has
gained infamy for her “contentious” views on the topic of gender. In an article entitled “How
feminist Meghan Murphy fell victim to progressives’ double standards,” National Post columnist
Barbara Kay (2019) sets out to defend Murphy from the backlash she has understandably
received for her views, likening her to a “dramatic protagonist” caught amidst a theatricalized
conflict between advocates of human rights for transgender persons (“trans activists”) and transexclusionary radical feminists, or “TERFs.” Kay (2019) writes in her article: “[t]he conflation of
biology with subjective feeling is, Murphy correctly argues, erasing women as a social
category.” First, let us not lose sight of the logically incontrovertible fact that the inclusion of
trans women into the fold of women as a distinct social group in no way poses a threat to the
solvency of the category of “woman” itself, nor does it threaten to erase the status of any
individual who claims, of her own accord, to be a woman as a member of a distinct, marginalized
social group.
With this in mind, not only does it become apparent that Kay’s words dubiously convey a
wholly unsubstantiated sense of panic over the dissolution of the category of woman, but also
and more importantly, that the Canadian journalist’s haphazard deployment of alarmist rhetoric
in support of the false premise of women’s social erasure can all too easily serve to obscure the
grave and urgent situation in which trans women specifically face disproportionate rates of
patriarchal oppression and gender-based violence in comparison to cis women throughout North
America. Regardless of Kay’s motivations or political leanings (a charitable reader might
attribute her indiscretion on this subject to little more than a journalistic penchant for
contrarianism), it is hastily strewn together arguments such as hers that threaten to lull
unsuspecting readers into agreement with the harmful and logically fallacious ideological camp
of trans-exclusionary radical feminism. Nevertheless, the quotation I have extracted from Kay’s
article is demonstrative of yet another logical inconsistency common to much of transexclusionary radical feminist discourse: Kay’s allusion to a “conflation of biology [and]
subjective feeling” among proponents of trans rights is predicated, quite ironically, on an
analogous presupposition of its own, namely the conflation of biology and identity – more
specifically, the fervent belief in the existence of a coextensive relationship between biological
sex and gender identity.
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The subtle yet far-reaching implication here is that one’s gender identity results directly
from his or her biology; in other words, it is the biological makeup of one’s body, to the
exclusion of all other factors, which occasions the attribution of either one or the other of two
mutually exclusive designations: male or female. The harmony between nature and culture,
and/or biology and (social) identity, entails that one may be (and notably, no discrepancy is
permitted to arise between being a man or a woman and identifying as such within this paradigm)
either male or female, never both or neither. Furthermore, it is precisely the supposedly
concretely empirical basis of biology – of physiological ‘maleness’ or ‘femaleness’ respectively
– which in turn determines, in a straightforward, one-to-one manner, one’s social identity as
either a man or a woman. The necessary and unchangeable correspondence between the body
into which one was born and her assigned identity ensures, so the story goes, that the assignation
of womanhood can be practiced without any initial or ongoing input on the part of the
gendered/sexed subject; one’s gender identity becomes an independently verifiable aspect of her
existence, inextricably bound to the contours, both visible and hidden, of her biology.
As a result, “biology,” when deployed as a euphemism for biological sex, can be viewed
as unaffected by, and unsusceptible to, the whims and uncertainties of “subjective feeling” (and
here, of course, we are forced to bracket the complexities and ambiguities of the physiological
body itself, which indeed throw the conflation of biology and identity even further into question).
Even if social identity bore a straightforward causal relationship to biology, even if it were
wholly reducible to biology, (and even this is in question within the very realm of biology itself),
the analytically distinct question of whether a given social identity can be deemed ‘true’ or
‘correct’ in a technical sense, from a strictly biological perspective, would be, and is, utterly
irrelevant to the smooth functioning of the myriad social relations which flow from the initial
assumption that one is the gender that she says she is. That one’s attestation of personal
membership to the social group known as “women” can be verified by biological means has no
bearing on her ability to adopt a female, or feminine, identity. Nor does the logic of
verificationism hold sway in the contemporary sphere of gender and sexual identification in
which a growing number of identities are proliferating exponentially, one of multiple gendered
identities, operate independently of the dictates of biology.
For “biology,” let us not forget, serves as a placeholder for a self-contained set of
principles which remain applicable and relevant to our bodies and our selves only on the basis of
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our provisional collective agreement, as critically thinking subjects, regarding their value to
society. Considering the status of biology as one domain among an array of others engaged in the
age-old pursuit of mastery over the slippery and evasive nature of human existence or human
being (a phenomenon which many esoteric philosophical doctrines have failed to adequately
capture or explain, not least because of our inescapable proximity to ourselves, the very beings
whose existence we wish to study from a distance, an unattainable vantage point for even the
most disciplined contemplators among us), it becomes apparent that the biological legitimacy of
one’s claim to be a man or a woman (indeed, even to be ‘male’ or ‘female,’ terms which can be
appropriated from their origin to mirror or mimic the symbolic authority historically exercised
over sexed subjects by agents of the entangled domains of medicine, psychiatry, and biology)
simply has no bearing on the ethical defensibility of a way of freely identifying, nor on the
phenomenological certainty and validity of an identity which a subject feels to be an intrinsic and
unchangeable aspect of his or her or their being (i.e. a core or ‘native’ gender identity).
To hold that social identities must be mediated through the scientific domain of biology is
only possible on the basis of a misperception of the nature of social identity itself and the various
social relations engendered and supported by our participation in multiple modes of
identification within multiple social spheres. Thus, it is indeed presumptuous to assert or imply
that personal declarations of membership to a social group (or identification with a particular
social identity) ought only to be accepted if they can be legitimized by the authority of biology, a
discipline which, like any other, is not without a history nor immune to bias on the part of, or
dissensus among, its numerous practitioners. While many of us identify in one way and one way
only across all social spheres (i.e. we identify as a man or as a woman regardless of the social
setting or environment in which we find ourselves), the broadscale social decontextualization
(and physiologico-temporal hypostatization) of gender identity perpetrated by Kay and other
sympathizers and proponents of trans-exclusionary feminism nevertheless erroneously implies,
and in some cases demands, that one’s gender identity be reinforced or legitimized by an external
authority, namely the authority which flows from the culturally coveted domain of biology, in
order for it to maintain its integrity. Crucially, trans theorist Talia Mae Bettcher’s model of First-
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Person Authority (FPA)25 provides an alternative framework which easily overcomes the vain
requirement of extrinsic verificationism with respect to gender identity.
In actuality, the social policing of gender rarely directly seeks to extort proof from
individuals as to the authenticity of their avowed gender identity. Make no mistake, instances of
forcible verification do, importantly, occur from time to time, such as in the violent act of
anatomical revelation enacted upon the body of American trans man Brandon Teena, or the
intrusive and gratuitous biological scrutiny directed towards female professional sprinter Dutee
Chand by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). However, the infrequency with which
comparable demands for verification are directed towards cisgender or cis-passing subjects is
palpably indicative of the intolerable incoherence endemic to the cissexist logic of gender
verificationism. Every day, cis people go about their lives without the legitimacy of their chosen
gender identities (and they are perpetually chosen; day to day and moment to moment we choose
to behave and present ourselves in ways that either conform to what is socially prescribed for us
as members of one or the other ‘sex’) ever being challenged or questioned as to whether they can
back up their claims of womanhood or manhood with biological evidence – that is, with an
appeal to the external authority of biology.
And in order to protect the sanctity of this appeal, to demonstrate our faith in the
objectivity of its findings whether they conflict with our desires or our “subjective feelings,” no
matter how deep and unignorable they may be, we must offer up a sacrifice: we must give over
our agency to the gatekeepers of our social and political welfare. For our own feelings can be
deceptive, and our proximity to them can cloud our judgment of the appropriateness or
justifiability of continuing to claim them as our own. Only biology can gain insight into our true
nature, the nature which dictates clearly and precisely which of our inclinations to action, and
indeed which parts of our anatomy, rightfully belong to us and which have been placed there
erroneously. Without a doubt, our possession of radical agency means that we cannot be trusted
to make the correct decisions regarding how to act and how to be, of our own accord, with only
the limited and frequently deceptive mode of perception endemic to the untrustworthy practice of
self-observation. And in return for this sacrifice, to add insult to injury, we receive no guarantees
that the identity with which we have declared an affinity will be deemed the proper one for us;
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we can only pray that our identity, our gender, is returned to us unharmed and we are allowed to
continue to identify with it without consequence.
However, this rigorous and intrusively interrogatory program of verification is not
applied equally to each of us who claim a gender (that, of course, would be inefficient in the
extreme) but rather is exclusively and forcefully on either those whom we believe, for one reason
or another, to be mistaken about their own identity, or whom we suspect are guilty of deception
with respect to the true nature of their gender or sex. Yet agency is the very thing that endows us
with the potential to rebel against gender norms that also and simultaneously lends us our
capacity to conform to the normative expectations of gender so idealized within our culture.
It is with this in mind that I wish to contend that to deprive a human being of agency is to
deprive her of her very humanity. To discount, disavow, or deny agency that facilitates one’s
avowal of his or her gender identity is to violate, at the same time, that most basic sense of
autonomy within us that has been called, by Sartre and others, our “radical ontological freedom.”
To deprive an individual of the right to freely avow her own gender identity, and indeed also her
‘sex,’ can only be seen as a repression of the fundamental human desire to be free – a desire
which resides among the most fundamental features of human existence.

3

The Ontology of Sexual Difference Through the Looking Glass: A
Deeper Look at Transphobic/Trans-Resistant Sentiment in
Feminist Philosophy

3.1

Introduction

In contrast to the emancipatory logic of resistance to systemic oppression typical of
Anglo-American feminisms, it is not only a commitment to equality and non-discrimination but
an irreducible notion of ontological difference which lies at the heart of Italian and French
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feminist thought.26 Feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray – whose reputation outside France
situates her amongst the most “active and vocal [advocates] of the concept of sexual difference”
(Grosz, 1989, p. 100) – persistently maintains throughout her body of work the controversial
assertion of the ontological irreducibility of the female sex to the male. She pits her insistence in
this regard on a paradigm of “true difference,” or “twoness,” of which gender is an essential
component, against the pervasive homogeneity, or “sameness” which she attributes to a
historically patriarchal culture built around one male subject whose neutral and singular authority
is predicated on the deeply entrenched repression of the feminine. Even the dichotomous
polarization of the gender and sexual binaries we have constructed in the West constitutes, for
Irigaray, a superficial and illusory framework of difference reducible to the underlying and
insidious logic of sameness (Grosz, 1989, p. 108). Notably, she does not strictly reserve this
criticism for the phallocratic regime of the dominant culture but applies it equally to the hitherto
uncritically reflexive strategies of resistance endemic to representationalist feminist politics
which, in striving for a position of equality (read: sameness) in relation to men, keeps female
subjects captive within a masculinized (read: singular) conception of subjectivity (Grosz, 1989,
p. 113).
In “Ethical Gestures Towards the Other,” the eighteenth chapter of Building a New
World, Irigaray plainly asserts a central tenet of her philosophical system of ethics: that “ethical
relations between human beings…[prove] to be impossible in a culture or tradition which the
subject appears as neuter or neutral” (Irigaray and Marder, 2014, p. 253). Throughout her corpus,
she contends that the masculinist linguistic and discursive norms endemic to the current
phallocratic order have obscured an unavoidable form of ontological difference which defines
human existence—which is, at its core, a relational existence, an existence invariably and
unavoidably affected by its fundamental inability to circumvent or surmount the existential
alterity of the other, who is, above all, a sexual other. Hence the domain of the feminine in
Irigaray, in which the corporeal female body figures prominently, takes on a high degree of
specificity and existential autonomy, and it is precisely this point which has inspired much of the
confusion and controversy over her work.
“In contradistinction to Anglo-American feminism, which emphasized both equality and emancipation
as ends,” writes Antonio Calcagno in his Translator’s Introduction to Lea Melandri’s Love and Violence,
“Italian feminism can be said to have stressed female difference, autonomy, and liberation” (Melandri
2019, p. ix).
26
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My main objective in this chapter is to expand Irigaray’s “notion of woman’s sexual
autonomy and specificity” (Grosz, 1989, p. 100) beyond the limited scope in which Irigaray
articulates it. I apply a transfeminist lens to her hypothesis of a specifically feminine
“morphology” as well as her psychoanalytically informed descriptions of “female sexuality” to
argue that, while she should not be branded as an essentialist, she unwittingly relies, at certain
moments, on outmoded traditional metaphysical presuppositions regarding the coextensive
relationship between gender identity and biological sex, thus unnecessarily foreclosing the
possibility of cross-sex identification. However, I contend that her notion of sexual difference
can be elaborated in an inclusive manner not incommensurable with the breadth of philosophical
innovation evident in the emergent “proto-disciplinary” (Currah, 2019, p. 2) field of transgender
studies. As Elaine Storkey (2001) points out, Irigaray’s descriptions of female identity and
sexuality (specifically her notion of “polymorphous sensuality”) need not be read as referential –
that is, as “a ‘true’ or accurate description of women” insofar as Irigaray makes no attempt to
“designate a female essence or anatomy” What she does intend to do, however, is to subvert
what she sees as “dominant male conceptions of women’s essence” (Grosz, 1989, p. 116), to
combat the dominant phallocentric representations of women and female sexuality which
saturate the whole of discourse within our patriarchal culture.27

3.2

The Sexually Differentiated Body

Carving out and maintaining a crucial, but often implicit, division between anatomy and
morphology, Irigaray shows us that morphological sexual difference can be understood as
This is readily apparent in Irigaray’s notorious metaphor of the “two lips,” which Elizabeth Grosz
(1989) lucidly analyses in the following passage from her book Sexual Subversions:
“So woman does not have a sex organ? She has at least two of them, but they are not identifiable
as ones. Indeed, she has many more. Her sexuality, always at least double, goes even further, it is
plural…Indeed, woman’s pleasure does not have to choose between clitoral activity and vaginal
passivity, for example. The pleasure of the vaginal caress does not have to be substituted for that
of the clitoral caress. They each contribute irreplaceably, to women’s pleasure. (1985b:28)
The ‘two lips’ is not a truthful image of female anatomy but a new emblem by which female sexuality can
be positively represented. For Irigaray, the problem for women is not the experience or recognition of
female pleasure, but its representation, which actively constructs women’s experience of their
corporeality and pleasures. If female sexuality and desire are represented in some relation to male
sexuality, they are submerged in a series of male-defined constraints” (p. 116).
27
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pluralistic and relational instead of binary and hierarchal. However, her preoccupation with
cultivating one’s natural identity in accordance with the body with which he or she was born
must be addressed and reconciled with insofar as the subsequent foreclosure (or, minimally,
pathologization) of cross-sex identification and gender nonconformity not only proves
inadequate to the political and theoretical objectives of trans(feminist) discourse but negates the
radical inclusivity inherent to the category of woman. Throughout her corpus Irigaray develops a
non-exclusionary notion of solidarity among women which she seeks to maintain and defend
against the partisan divineness of social activist groups in the women’s liberation movement as
well as the realm of political feminist thought itself.
Considering that such a feminist political outlook must necessarily be predicated upon an
inherently anti-essentialist definition of woman that decisively rejects the incorporation of
essential criteria such as the possession of a single trait or collection of essential feminine traits, I
argue that although Irigaray’s notion of sexual difference does not fundamentally rely on
biological essentialism and thus can be articulated along radically inclusive lines. In this vein, the
Irigaray of I Love to You (1996) portrays the category of woman as a “plurality that seems to
elude the definition of a unity” (p. 64). So, the category of woman cannot be defined positively.
However, its conceptual irreducibility and categorical incoherence can be taken up as sources of
strength insofar as the term ‘woman’ implies an irresolvably complex, various, and acausal
relationship between nature and culture. It is precisely the combination of radical ontological
ambiguity and perpetual openness which lends woman the unique freedom to constantly reinvent
and rearticulate (or indeed, conversely, to embrace and affirm) her cultivated relationship to
nature, thus preventing the category of woman on the whole from ever acquiescing to the
epistemological trap of essentialism.
As such, there is unity to be found, paradoxically and counterintuitively, in the radical
conceptual disunity specific to female identification and embodiment which stands in opposition,
in Western culture and Western thought, to the naturalized primacy, originality, and neutrality of
the masculine subject position. In the same stroke as she affirms woman’s inherent multiplicity,
however, Irigaray cites the possible unifying capacity of “natural immediacy,” a notion which
lacks a clear definition despite the fact that she returns to it repeatedly, even possessively
appropriating it as “my natural immediacy” (Irigaray, 1996, p. 63; Irigaray, 1996, p. 64).
Elsewhere in the text, as she weaves between generic consideration of the phenomenon of female
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birth and personal reflection on her own birth as a “girl,” she asserts: “[n]o doubt female
physiology is present [at birth], but not identity, which remains to be constructed” (Irigaray,
1996, p. 107).
According to feminist biologist Ann Fausto-Sterling (2000), a majority of feminist
scholars have tended to view the body “not as essence, but as a bare scaffolding on which
discourse and performance build a completely acculturated being” (p. 6). Such a formulation
stands in stark contrast to the hypothesis of essentialism, the “belief that there are properties
essential to women and which all women share” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 6). However, the
unfinished project of identity to which Irigaray refers in the above quotation—although it does
not boil down to a matter of teleological determination—also does not align with the social
constructivist hypothesis of the body as a raw material surface which pre-exists its sexed
signification. To be born a girl, according to Irigaray, is to be born with a certain physiological
makeup. “Of course,” she writes, “there is no question of [identity] being constructed in
repudiation of one’s physiology” (Irigaray, 1996, p. 107). This statement amounts to a blatant
and needless pre-emptive disavowal of cross-sex identification, and this is the crucial point on
which I disagree with Irigaray. There is in fact an abundance of possibility to repudiate one’s
physiology through the construction of identity, not in a merely theoretical sense but at the
phenomenological level of lived actuality, as demonstrated in the wealth of trans narratives
which provide contradictory evidence to Irigaray’s narrow sighted claim. For the contours of
physiological sex are increasingly contested not only by sociological critiques of a feminist ilk
but by the empirical findings of the culturally and symbolically authoritative domain of biology
itself.
The casual manner in which she glosses over the possibility of divergence between
identity and “physiology” betrays an affinity with Freud’s biologism insofar as she fails to
critique, and thus keeps intact, the determinative power of physiology over identity. But such a
conflation of woman with a singular blueprint of her physiological makeup, however
unintentional and secondary to her overall project, is unforgivingly untenable both politically and
theoretically. The rhetoricity of her dismissal of refuting one’s physiology in the above quotation
camouflages the uncritical assumption of a causal connection between identity and physiology;
and the faith in the coextensive relation between gender identity and physiological sex of which
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her remarks are indicative is a surprising presupposition to fall back on considering the otherwise
keenly critical nature of her analysis.
Ultimately, I intend to emphasize the historicity of the system of sex determination
endemic the culture into which subjects are born without discounting the possibility that a
genealogical critique thereof could easily function in tandem with Irigaray’s analysis of sexual
difference. Although Irigaray’s philosophy of sexual difference, which frequently invokes the
potentially hegemonic identity category of ‘woman’ and the biologically resonant term ‘female,’
has been decried and dismissed by critics for its incommensurability with the political and
theoretical ends of poststructuralist gender theory, especially with respect to transsexual and
transgender liberation, I argue that the deployment of dominant gender terms in Irigaray’s
writings can be read through an anti-essentialist, non-biological reductionist lens which attends
to the psycho-anatomical diversity of femininity, including both transfemininity and intersex
femininity.
It is possible, I claim, to reconcile the Irigarayan framework of sexual difference with the
emergent perspectives on gender set forth in the myriad of burgeoning discourses in the field of
transgender studies, as well as to tailor discussions of sexual difference inspired by Irigaray to
the urgent political demands of trans resistance, inasmuch as sexual difference cannot simply be
conflated with bodily difference (even if the latter is understood in broader than binary terms)
but refers to a dynamic process whereby individuals cultivate their identity in relation to their
embodiment. While Irigaray is acutely aware of the symbolic nature of bodily organization, as
evinced by her invocation of the notion of “morphology,” which, in her parlance, signals a
departure from the domain of “anatomy,” her delineation of female sexuality relies partially on
outmoded presuppositions, both implied and explicitly stated, about female anatomical
materiality and the connection between one’s cultivated female identity and the body with which
he or she is born. Thus, a transfeminist reading of Irigaray will no doubt require, as Danielle Poe
(2011) points out, that we read Irigaray against herself (p. 118).
In the titular essay of her monograph This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray’s (1985)
discussion of sexual pleasure and erogeneity revolves entirely around the body. Whereas the
classical psychoanalytic construction of anatomical femininity remains trapped in a patriarchal
framework of hierarchal binary opposition which imbues the materiality of the female body with
the supposedly inescapable attributes of passivity and lack in relation to the active and fully
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formed force of masculinity, Irigaray refuses to confine femininity to the negative by defining it
as consisting in the absence rather than the presence of distinguishing features. She repudiates
the reduction of woman’s multiple erogenous zones to “a non-sex, or a masculine organ turned
back upon itself” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 23) perpetrated by Freud and others by emphasizing the
embodied plurality of female sexuality in her descriptions of a variety of bodily erogenous zones,
thereby circumventing the absolute primacy of masculine anatomical singularity which deprives
the female sex of a positive definition.
Over and against the androcentric solipsism of psychoanalysis, by which I mean
specifically to emphasize the Freudian tendency to posit femininity as a lack in relation to the
phallus, Irigaray (1985) imagines the female body as a multiplicity of sexual organs. Strictly
speaking, according to her mimetic revamping of psychoanalytic language which, cleverly, does
not stray from the biological intonation or technical specificity of its terminology, woman does
not have a single sex organ but “at least two of them,” which are nevertheless “not identifiable as
ones” in and of themselves (p. 28). For Irigaray (1985), the female sex, unlike the male, is not
defined by her/its possession of a single sex organ (e.g. one analogous to the phallus), nor can it
be reduced to its startling appearance of lack against the substantial backdrop of the male
phallus. Rather, the female sex can be rendered in terms of a collection of many sexual organs:
“woman has sex organs more or less everywhere” (p. 28). Female sexuality, therefore, is never
singular (i.e. masculine), but always plural (Irigaray, 1985, p. 28). Further, it does not by any
means appear necessary that the multiplicity of organs constitutive of the female sex must be
observed uniformly in all women but may be subject to variances and anomalies.
Precisely what is it, however, that requires the designation of the range of sexual organs
Irigaray (1985) names (including the breasts, vulva, clitoris, and vagina) as feminine (p. 28)? In
direct refutation of biological essentialism, I argue that the link between bodily materiality and
ontological femininity must be autonomous and constative self-identification. For what does
female embodiment amount to without the clarificatory addition of female identity? Irrespective
of the influence of a plethora of cultural norms on sexed subjects, the saturation of identity with
discursivity, and the potentially non-volitional nature of gender identification implied by Butler’s
infamous theory of performativity, the enduring significance of identity must not be discounted
or devalued. Regardless of whether femininity is ontologically innate or socially constructed, and
correspondingly, whether the criteria for femininity are anatomically dependent or the result of
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social conditioning, a vast array of transsexual narratives imply that the category of so-called
“biological sex” is intimately and inextricably tied to identity. Furthermore, as our engagement
with Kessler’s (1998) qualitative interviews with pediatric surgeons and endocrinologists has
elucidated, the medical determination of sex at birth is more imprecise than one might hope for
the simple reason that for the notion of biological ‘sex’ to be objective and applicable to human
beings, the experience of perfect alignment between psychological interiority and external
anatomy – which has not yet had a chance to develop or not develop in the infantile pre-subject –
would have to be a universally shared experiential condition. And we know, if we listen and pay
attention to the voices and narratives of our trans brothers and sisters, that it is not.

3.3

Sexual Difference and Transsexuality

In “Doing Justice to Someone: Sex Reassignment and Allegories of Transsexuality,”
Butler (2001), in a questionable move, takes up the case of David Reimer, the anonymous
subject of the “John/Joan case” which circulated in medical circles before being widely
publicized and used as fodder by theorists of gender, feminist activists, and social critics of all
stripes. Reimer’s experience of gender has been narrativized in a tragic light by numerous
biographers and journalists, after his death by suicide. But Reimer’s autonomy and dignity as a
gendered subject was first and most intrusively invaded while he was alive by psychologist and
sexologist John Money, who encouraged his parents to allow him to undergo surgical and
hormonal gender reassignment as an infant following a failed circumcision that caused severe
and irreversible damage to his genitals, and to raise Reimer as a girl. When Reimer, who was
born with XY chromosomes, “was eight months old, his penis was accidentally burned and
severed during a [routine] surgical operation” (Butler, 2001, p. 184). Despite extensive efforts on
the part of his parents and physicians to raise him as a girl, a decision made based on the strong
professional recommendation of John Money, Reimer recognized or discovered his masculine
identity early on in his childhood and subsequently lived out his adult life as a man. Ironically,
Reimer’s life in its retrospective totality has since been appropriated in service of prompting “a
revision and a reversal in developmental gender theory, providing evidence…that counter’s
Money’s thesis [regarding the malleability of gender socialization], supporting the notion of an

35
essential gender core tied in some irreversible way to anatomy and to a deterministic sense of
biology” (Butler, 2001, p. 186).
Irrespective of ongoing and contentious debates over biological essentialism and social
constructivism, the bottom line for contemporary gender theory is indisputably clear: we must
listen to and respect the incontrovertibility of trans claims to belong to a sex. The desire or need
for anatomical reassignment is evident in a plethora of trans narratives. In what Atalia IsraeliNevo (2017) calls the classic narrative of transsexual transition, exemplified by Caitlyn Jenner’s
highly publicized transition story, both the temporal trajectory of and the physical alterations
involved in transition align and cohere with established cultural expectations of development and
biological metrics of male/female physiology and anatomy: the person transitioning seeks, in a
linearly progressive manner, to confirm or attain an identity deprived to them by their current
embodied condition with respect to its possession or lack of certain anatomical and/or
physiological traits (Israeli-Nevo, 2017, p. 35). Accordingly, there is a wealth of “[t]ranssexual
discourse that understands sexual difference as a dualism” (Poe, 2011, p. 119).
Likewise, the category of transgender—although it was originally “introduced [in the
mid-1990s] as a broad umbrella term—bringing together different gender-variant people”
(Bettcher, 2014, p. 384)—need not be seen as oriented toward the eradication or obfuscation of
difference: terminologically, the word “transgender” implies an oppositive relation to the subject
position of “cisgender.” Thus, transgender identification, far from entailing the erasure of the
many relational differences between sexed subjects, in fact marks a tacit recognition of
differences and oppositions, albeit not strictly or necessarily in the straightforward sense of
essential, static, binary, or predetermined difference. Indeed, for Jack Halberstam (2005),
“[t]ransgender proves to be an important term not to people who want to reside outside of
categories altogether but to people who want to place themselves in the way of particular forms
of recognition” (p. 49).
Talia Mae Bettcher (2014) outlines the inception of what she calls the “transgender
paradigm,” a radical new vision of gender which subscribes to a “beyond the binary” model
which ostensibly subverts the gender binary and deconstructs the exclusionary dichotomous
logic by which trans and gender nonconforming people are systematically marginalized and
oppressed (pp. 383-384). Since the advent of trans studies in conjunction with the transgender
politics forged by Leslie Feinberg and Kate Bornstein in the mid-1990s, the notion of gender as
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spectrum has gained significant traction, eventually attaining widespread acceptance within both
intersectional feminist-activism and academia (Bettcher, 2014, p. 384). From the perspective of
the transgender paradigm, the proliferation of identificatory taxonomies is viewed as a
subversive counter-hegemonic enterprise in opposition to the dichotomous heterosexual
disciplinary norm. In short, discourses at the frontiers of transgender studies and activism has
come to reflect a systematic and supposedly unitary “attempt to move beyond dichotomies”
(Sullivan, 2003, p. 116).
But the universalizing, utopian vision touted by the “beyond-the-binary” transgender
movement has been met with measured resistance from transsexuals who “see themselves as
nonconsensually subsumed under the transgender umbrella” (Bettcher, 2014, p. 385). One major
concern regarding the transgender paradigm is the way in which its allegiance to social
constructionism is at odds with “the actual experiences of transsexual people for whom gender
identity seems impervious to cultural modification” (Bettcher, 2014, p. 385). Indeed, Alenka
Zupančič (2012) notes that “[o]ne of the conceptual deadlocks in simply emphasizing that gender
is an entirely social, or cultural, construction is that it remains within the dichotomy
nature/culture.” Therefore, compared to its predecessor the wrong-body model, the beyond-thebinary model is equally incapable of justifying the epistemic centrality of constative selfidentification insofar as it takes for granted dominant gender terms (Bettcher, 2014, p. 385). The
inadequacy of the transgender paradigm to which she subscribes stems from its inability to offer
strategies of resistance to those who do not conform to its delimiting parameters of subversion.
In short, the transgender paradigm exclusively “locates the resistant potential of trans people
beyond the binary” (Bettcher, 2014, p. 404). The transgender paradigm is amnesiac of the fact
that the transgender paradigm upholds the gender binary by necessitating that all resistance be
organized in oppositional relation to it. Hence its refusal to authenticate acts of political
resistance made by those whose mode of gendered identification resides within the binary logic
of the heterosexual regime.
Over and against the impulse to eradicate the notion of sexual difference rather than
rather than reinterpret or expand its purview, I argue that the absolutely inalienable and
ineradicable force of constative self-identification with respect to gender and/or sex (which often
entails the rigid assumption of either a male or female identity) can exist in harmonious
simultaneity with the recognition of irreducible difference. Human beings are historical and
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social creatures forced to contend simultaneously with our inescapable embodied relationship to
what Irigaray calls “the natural.” Yet this observation in no way precludes the radical openness
of either gender or sex to processes of de-/re-construction, transformation, and alteration—
whether imaginary or corporeal, conceptual or practical. The metaphysically essential notion of
womanhood or femininity endemic to early feminist thought and praxis cannot be universalized
as a self-evident and irrefutable ontological truth nor has it proven objectively verifiable by
empirical scientific means; yet simultaneously I see no productive reason to discount or
invalidate claims which may appear to (or indeed explicitly seek to) recapitulate the hypothesis
of essentialism. Indeed, subjective claims to possess a native gender or an essentially gendered
core can be asserted with apodictic certitude by individuals whose felt experience of gender
contributes to the confirmation of the essentialist outlook which certain theorists and activists
find untenable. Essentialism and constructivism are but two among a plethora of possible ways
of orienting oneself toward gender, each of which, I claim, must be defended as equally credible
from a critical transfeminist standpoint.
Not only have we moved past the need to rely rigidly and exclusively on the antiquated
paradigms of biological or metaphysical essentialism, but Irigaray’s work, correspondingly, can
be read otherwise than as advocating any form of essentialism, whether biological or anatomical,
despite both her tacit reliance on bodily norms and her admittedly problematic negligence of
actual discourses on sexual and gender nonconformity. I wish to suggest that Irigaray’s
nominally parochial notion of female sexual specificity is not indicative of an irredeemably
essentialist faith in the anatomical reducibility of sexual difference, and thus can be expanded
and elaborated in radically inclusive directions. Relatedly, Irigaray herself excels (unsurprisingly
given the extent of her psychoanalytic influence) in articulating the interconnected relationship
of sex, gender, and sexuality (encapsulated by her notion of “female sexuality”) with attention to
each term’s thorough implication in the symbolic register. Further, not only is each term which
comprises the sex-gender-sexuality triad itself caught up in the ethereal domain of language and
culture but the relationship between each term is also highly symbolic – which is to say
linguistically and culturally mediated.
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3.4

Addressing the Charge of Essentialism in Irigaray

In observation of the centrality of the body to Irigaray’s delineation of sexual difference
in her writings, it is not difficult to locate compelling evidence for the allegations of essentialism
waged against her. Indeed, as Danielle Poe (2011) observes, “[t]he argument that Irigaray relies
on biological essentialism for her notion of sexual difference seems to come from her analysis of
women’s bodies” (p. 113). Identifying a deceptively uniform array of “specifically female
pleasures” including “[f]ondling the breasts, touching the vulva, spreading the lips, stroking the
posterior wall of the vagina, brushing against the mouth of the uterus, and so on,” Irigaray (1985)
posits a closed circuit of plural but ultimately contained features which exist in a state of mutual
exclusion to the masculine singularity of the phallus (p. 28). However, the boundary between
feminine and phallic or masculine embodiment, which is palpably present in Irigaray’s writings,
cannot be ubiquitously upheld in reality. In human embodiment – whether cis, trans, and
nonbinary – there will always be slippages, crossings, discursive and somatic excesses
recalcitrant to normative classification.
We must therefore interrogate our latent presuppositions regarding the corporeal
specificity of the female body and of female sexuality in a radically anti-essentialist way. And, if
we are charitable, we can use Irigaray’s framework of sexual difference to do so. Unfortunately,
as we have seen, discourses which purport to locate gender “beyond the binary” fail to offer a
sufficient alternative to the hegemony of the gender binary, or to definitively refute the broader
notion that sexual difference constitutes a central aspect of the human condition. Indeed, the
proper rejection of dualistic difference – a refutation which would transcend even the ostensibly
emancipatory notion of gender as spectrum – constitutes a problematic avenue of thought insofar
as humanity depends for its posterity on reproduction. Relatedly, Hilge Landweer (2005) aims to
center the debate around the fundamental concept of generativity:
I claim that reproduction is indeed a topic that has to be negotiated on a social-theoretical level
and that it should not be turned into a taboo on grounds of a general suspicion of essentialism.
Due to the anthropologically still valid fact that humans are born and die, generativity leads in
every culture to categorizations of “gender.” By generativity I mean the simple insight that
human societies (similar to many animals) depend for their reproduction on two sexes, no matter
to what extent and with which culturally specific meaning” (Poe, 2011, p. 116).

39
Although it can be developed in a heterosexist manner, there is nothing binding the fundamental
notion of generativity to the exclusionary legacies of oppression and violence to which it has
found itself tied for centuries. Technological advancements in reproductive technology
notwithstanding, it remains an insurmountable fact that the human animal is bound to ongoing
processes of generation and degeneration, both in life and in death. In spite of the powerful and
polemical nature of Lee Edelman’s (2004) attack on the ideological imperative of reproductive
futurity—a notion predicated on a pervasively heterosexualized logic of futural investment
which underpins the very sphere of the political in the West—we have little hope of completely
displacing the conceptual “trap” of dualism considering the centrality of reproduction to human
posterity. Although we can, and should, trenchantly critique the resultant valorization of
heterosexuality and heterosexual relations which stems from uncritical acceptance of our
investment in reproduction and the future as ideological constructs, the fact remains that the
logic of generativity constitutes the fundamental condition of possibility for human existence,
and a total negation of generativity would spell the eradication of the species.
Crucially, however, the generative aspect of human life, which renders the notion of
sexual difference an ineradicable theoretical consideration, does not preclude a cultural
interpretation of sexual difference as multiplicitous instead of binary. For Poe (2011), “sexual
difference is something that is perpetually present, but its manifestations continue to change and
evolve” (p. 117). In other words, sexual difference is not bound by any biologically specific
criteria to the extent that the male/female dyad (with its attendant sets of mutually opposing
physiological and anatomical characteristics) falls short of satisfying any fixed criteria which
could defensibly be rendered as naturally necessary.
Ample justification for such a speculative assertion can be drawn from the empirical
findings of a region of current evolutionary biological research which emphasizes not only the
high degree of physiological variance among individuals assigned to one or the other biological
sex category but the fact that sex traits can be viewed as dynamic and not static. Specifically, I
am referring to the dynamic model of sex inaugurated by Malin Ah-King and Sören Nylin
(2010), in which sex is emphasized as “a dynamic process in which organisms have more or less
‘open potentials’ of sex, sex related characteristics, and behavior” (Ah-King & Hayward, 2014,
p. 6). In short, sex, at the physiological level, is not only a highly variant category in that it
differs from body to body (and incidentally it does so in a pluralistic rather than a merely
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dualistic fashion), but also a highly variable category (in that its expression(s) is/are reactive and
subject to change over time within one and the same body). Hence the vast array of unique
anatomical formations among those who identify as members of the same ‘sex’ demonstrably
illustrates the constructed and ambiguous nature of sex itself. On this view, the falsely totalizing
paradigm of sexual dimorphism represents one instantiation among many possible instantiations
of sexual difference, even if the latter is understood as a fundamental physiological and
ontological reality.
Sexual difference can thus be revealed to possess no necessary teleology; considering that
the trajectory of its cultural development did not have to result, in the absence of divine
predetermination or biological necessity, in the construction of (and subsequently serve as a basis
for the disciplinary societal maintenance of) a gendered social stratification system predicated on
a binary logic of hierarchal dualism, we must thusly concede that the notion of sexual difference
retains within it, in however diminished a form, the capacity to be retroactively remoulded and
rearticulated as relational as opposed to hierarchal. No doubt, the unfolding of history thus far in
the West has tended to privilege hierarchal opposition, resulting in the cultivation of a nearly
ubiquitous general dynamic of masculine domination and feminine subordination – one well
concealed by the purportedly primal and original authority attributed to oppressive patriarchal
structures of power.
The notion of difference contains within it the possibility to be articulated otherwise than
in binary hierarchal terms; the fundamental notion of difference is not, at bottom, indebted to the
hierarchal dualism of dominant gender terms, nor must it loyally maintain its historical
attachment to the paradigm of sexual dimorphism reinforced by our culture’s legacy of
biological and medical discourses. Incidentally, not only does the replacement of hierarchy with
relationality lie firmly within the realm of speculative possibility, but the advent of such a
paradigmatic shift is not hindered by any known biological conditions. In spite of her recognition
of the conceptual potentiality of relationality, however, Irigaray is stubborn in her cathexis to
traditional depictions of the male-female dynamic, clinging to the indissolubility of bodily
differences between man and woman. In I Love to You, Irigaray (1996) remarks with
indefensible conviction:
Some of our prosperous and naïve contemporaries, women and men, would like to wipe out all
difference by resorting to monosexuality, to the unisex, and to what is called identification: even
if I am bodily a man or a woman, I can identify with, and so be, the other sex. This new opium of
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the people annihilates the other in the illusion of a reduction to identity, equality, and sameness,
especially between man and woman, the ultimate anchorage of real alterity (p. 62).

The idea that one can be identified as “bodily a man or a woman” blatantly implies an
unnecessary conflation of a specific set of anatomical traits with the discursive and socially
mediated identity categories of manhood and womanhood. Such an uncritical conflation violates
the pluralistic notion of sexual difference that Irigaray herself has developed in opposition to the
homogenous and delimiting psychoanalytic one. Irigaray’s outright refusal in the above passage
to admit the conceptual possibility of crossing sex boundaries hinges, troublingly, on a failure to
rigorously maintain the crucial distinction between anatomy and morphology, a distinction to
which Irigaray is ironically highly attuned throughout the vast majority of her work.
“Morphology,” within the context of the innovative conceptual framework of what
Margaret Whitford calls Irigaray’s Body Symbolic, refers to “the way in which bodies are
culturally mediated” (Poe, 2011, p. 123). Elizabeth Grosz (1989) notes that “[if] morphology is
reduced to biology, the charge of essentialism seems well justified,” yet “[the] reduction of
morphology to biology occurs only on the crudest of misreadings” (p. 113). The notion of
morphology invokes a host of both cultural and biological norms which get inscribed on the
body since birth, norms which are endlessly, habitually, and coercively reinforced both at the
hands of others and internally in the psyche of the subject. Moreover, poststructuralist discourses
teach us that these features, which can easily be mistakenly understood as being inscribed on the
pre-discursive surface of already extant material bodies, are actually, paradoxically generative or
constitutive of the concept of the body itself.28
Thus, the centrality of genital anatomy to the cultural intelligibility or legibility of one’s
sex can be revealed as a constructed and arbitrary standard rooted as much in our cultural
imaginary as it is in the likewise culturally permeated system of sex determination used in the
biological and medical spheres. Indeed, Sandy Stone (1992), in her groundbreaking
“Posttranssexual Manifesto,” echoes Judith Shapiro’s (1991)29 insight that “[t]o those…who
might be inclined to diagnose the transsexual’s focus on the genitals as obsessive or fetishistic,

28

Relatedly, Judith Butler has deftly demonstrated in her work that bodily materiality is always already
saturated with discursivity and thus affected by masculinist processes of codification; as we begin to
discern and uncover “the history of sexual difference encoded in the history of matter, it [becomes]
radically unclear whether a notion of matter or the materiality of bodies can serve as the uncontested
ground of feminist practice” (Butler, 1990, p. 26).
29
See Shapiro (1991).
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the response is that they are, in fact, simply conforming to their culture’s criteria for gender
assignment” (p. 231). Shapiro’s (1991) prescient defense of anatomical transition coheres with
insights voiced by a number of scholars on gender and sexuality. Elizabeth Grosz (1990), for
one, states in Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction that “[t]he body is lived in accordance
with an individual’s and a culture’s concepts of biology…the imaginary body is the consequence
of the meaning of biology rather than biology itself (p. 44). Similarly, for Thomas Laqueur
(1992), “[a]natomy…is obviously not pure fact, unadulterated by thought or convention, but
rather a richly complicated construction based…on observation, and on a variety of social and
cultural constraints on the practice of science” (pp. 163-164). Margaret Whitford (1991), for
another, “points out that…anatomical reference is never an unmediated reflection, even in
phallomorphic discourse” (100). And in the words of Danielle Poe (2011), “we begin with some
anatomical structures, but the interpretation of our anatomy is filtered through culture” (p. 123).
However, the constructedness and historicity of the widespread cultural and subjective
psychological meaning of anatomy, and specifically the emphasis on genitality, does not detract
from the significance of its influence on the social and cultural levels. Nor does the fact of its
historical construction, in and of itself, necessarily have any bearing on its desirability or its
value as a metric for cultural and clinical processes of sex determination. Nevertheless, such
insights throw light on the arbitrariness of the procedural centrality of visible factors such as
external genitalia to the social determination of one’s sex at birth, exposing anatomical
reductionism as a material effect of the cultural mediation of biology (specifically the biological
branch of morphology, of which anatomy is technically a subdiscipline). Thus, Irigaray’s
ungrounded categorical refusal of cross-sex identification as an effacement of difference can
only indicate a temporary lapse, a slippage from the sharp awareness of the distance between the
anatomical and the morphological realms which characterizes her work as a whole.

3.5

Redefining the Morphology of the Feminine: A Transfeminist
Recuperation of Irigaray’s Model of Sexual Difference

Faced, at this juncture, with what can only be viewed as an aporia from a transfeminist
perspective, one solution is to follow Irigaray’s own counsel in “Women’s Exile”: that “[w]e
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must go back to the question not of the anatomy but of the morphology of the female sex” (1977,
p. 64). At the same time, however, the concept of anatomy is also an indispensable aspect of our
culture’s notion of biological sex, and thus figures prominently in trans discourses. In any case,
the prejudicial assertion that one’s sexed identity must be cultivated in accordance with the body
does not preclude the alternative possibility, for others who are not Irigaray, of the cultivation of
a sexed or sexually differentiated “spirit” that is incongruent with the body with which one is
born. Irigaray violates the integrity of her own critical project by failing to address the implicit
assumption latent in her statement, “I was born a woman,” that the anatomical features present in
her body at birth should determine the character of her spiritual development. She assumes,
based on her own experience of cisgender embodiment, that the linearly progressive nature of
her own developmental trajectory of spiritual cultivation with respect to her sexed body can be
universalized, and thus that, because her relation to sex has remained constant and unchanged
over the course of her lifetime, that such standards of psychosomatic alignment and temporal
consistency can be taken as ontological norms.
Irigaray’s (1996) characterization of sexual difference as an “immediate and natural
given” (p. 47) need not be taken as a deterministic appeal to biology or to ‘Nature’ in the
normative sense but instead could be charitably interpreted as an affirmation of the
indeterminacy of sex, and a recognition of the fact that sexual difference is not a biological given
but, as Danielle Poe (2011) puts it, a “process of cultivating nature” (p. 123). Irigaray rightfully
observes that “[n]o one nature can claim to correspond to the whole of the natural. There is no
‘Natural’ as a singular entity” (1996, p. 35). The trouble, as Poe (2011) succinctly summarizes it,
stems from the fact that “Irigaray’s descriptions of cultivating the natural require one to cultivate
the body with which one is born,” while transsexual accounts of identity cultivation, in
antagonistic relation to this tacit imperative, require a great deal more agency insofar as they
involve “changing [the body], or the way that others view [the body]” (p. 123). Within Irigaray’s
underdeveloped paradigm of ontological sexual difference, the rejection of the sex assigned to
one at birth can only signify a retreat into the deceptive clutches of identity, under which lies an
illusory abyss of ontological sameness.
“It’s not as Simone de Beauvoir said: one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman
(through culture), but rather: I am born a woman, but I still must become this woman that I am
by nature,” writes Irigaray (1996, p. 107). However, trans claims to womanhood complicate the
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presumption of inborn femininity that Irigaray appears to take for granted and erodes the solidity
of the hypothesis of ultimate alterity between the sexes, the ontological disparity between man
and woman. Take for example Atalia Israeli-Nevo’s (2017) plain and succinct statement, “I
wasn’t born a trans woman” (p. 34). Unlike Irigaray, Israeli-Nevo holds that she was not born a
woman, even though she is unquestionably a woman today and therefore holds as much
dominion over the mantle of ontological femininity as does Irigaray and as do all women.
Irigaray’s articulation of sexual difference constitutes a clever marriage of biological
determinism and personal autonomy in which one must existentially come to terms with the
originary femininity of her body. Yet her method of description fixes the temporality of
psychosexual development to the birth and death of a static subject, forcing one to identify with
the body with which one is born, foreclosing (or at least pathologizing) the possibility to alter
one’s body, and thus to take up a different relationship to the notion of origin, which Irigaray
parochially restricts to natality and the maternal scene, according absolute primacy to the event
of biological birth.
Irigaray remains ignorant to (or at least silent on) the possibility that the generativity of
maternal-biological birth can be metaphorically appropriated, and its temporally disrupted,
insofar as one can choose, later in life (either as an adult or an autonomous decision-making
child) to alter one’s embodiment through the use of hormones, surgery, or both, to such an extent
that s/he experiences a second birth by assuming, adopting, or being “born into” a female body—
which, importantly, is not to discount the claim that one was always a woman on the part of trans
women who were indeed, as only they can attest, born women. Israeli-Nevo’s personal narrative
underscores the absurdity of positing a definitive link between any one form of embodiment to
the attainment of womanhood. She defines her own transition as a process without a definitive
ending, which contradicts the classic model that it must eventually – and the quicker the better –
culminate in a state of “completion.” On this front, Irigaray misses the extent to which the
materiality of a body designated female at birth (viz. assigned a female sex) constitutes the
discursive effect of a vast collection of normative culturally inscribed meanings attributed to it
within the cis/heterosexist grid of cultural intelligibility that designates bodily materiality as male
or female.
To be “born a girl” (Irigaray 1990, p. 107) does not constitute the only avenue into
female embodiment. The possession of corporeal-morphological femininity ought not to be
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gatekept by such a specific yet empirically ambiguous criterion. Her description of a reality in
which one must cultivate the natural immediacy and indisputable givenness of sexual difference
as an affirmational process of becoming what one already is betrays a concealed personal bias
which can be extracted from the workings of her ultimately robustly inclusive notion of sexual
difference itself. She regards the inescapable ubiquity of sexually differentiated embodiment as
tied to a broader situation facing each human being, namely our entrapment within an absolutely
irreducible condition of existential alterity in opposition to the sexual other.
But the way in which she binds that conception of ontological alterity to the body is
arguably problematic. For Irigaray, it seems, there appears to be a fragment of universal
difference lodged within the individual subject which corresponds exclusively to the anatomical
organization of the body with which one is born. Yet what of the fact that one’s relationship to
her or his body, the body into which s/he was born, is not immune to processes of
transformation, modification, and rearticulation as deemed desirable, even necessary or natural,
by the subject who inhabits that body? Surgical and medical technologies now engender methods
of altering the body in accordance with one’s lived experience of sex and gender, while
historically, and at the same time, the socially visible perceptions dimension of the body has
always been and continues to be intentionally manipulated, and with far less difficulty in strictly
pragmatic terms.
Notably, the thing, besides the body, that is being “manipulated” in such instances is not
necessarily some essential spiritual or ontological property—though it certainly can be. But it is
never this property alone that is affected by the process of transition; even in cases in which an
individual seeks medical intervention as a direct means, not only of ‘passing’ as one gender or
another, but of ontologically becoming that desired or innate gender, what also inevitably
undergoes a process of change and evolution during that transition is one’s complex personal
relationship to a set of hegemonic cultural beliefs and assumptions about sexual difference that
have been imposed on him or her from birth. And these beliefs and assumptions, in addition to
having a tendency to evolve and fluctuate over the course of history, cannot be traced back to
any objective or static origins, in either a metaphysical or biological sense. As such, they must be
interrogated, even if we are to decide in the end that they still have some use to us.
Instead of acknowledging that the possibility of changing one’s body to cultivate a
different subject position remains open, Irigaray refuses to admit the ontological import of
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constative self-identification, diagnosing the possibility of authentic cross-sex identification,
rather flippantly to say the least, as an “opium of the people.”
In my view, however, the limited scope of her work with respect to its fundamental
inability to incorporate a growing body of theoretical work on transsexual and transgender
ontology nor the expanding body of scientific research on sex variability in an evolutionary
context merely indicates an arbitrary personal unwillingness to actively elaborate the theory of
sexual difference in a radically inclusive direction, but not a foreclosure of that possibility. I
believe, like Poe (2011), that we can use “Irigaray’s rejection of biological essentialism to
counter [her own] rejection of transsexual and transgender identification” (p. 116). As such, I
seek to move toward a radically inclusive recuperation of sexual difference which does not
threaten to undermine the validity of trans people’s identities or the ontological weight of trans
narratives. Still, Irigaray’s misapprehension of cross-sex identification as a reduction to
“sameness” amounts to a stark refusal to consider the vast and open potentialities inherent in the
notion of “cultivating one’s nature.” Irigaray mistakes the inclusive and non-essentialist alterity
of sexual difference for static forms of bodily difference which supposedly exist between all men
and all women. Differences do, of course, exist between men and women. But an equal degree of
difference also exists among the anatomically diverse field of women and female-identified
people: some women have penises, and some do not; some women have uteri, and some do not.
Therefore, it is not justifiable to presuppose any static anatomical criteria for what makes one
“bodily a man or a woman.” Ironically, it would seem that Irigaray’s cultural biases, in
combination with her positionality as a cis woman, leave her trapped within the clutches of a
cissexist relativism that posits a predetermined array of “natural” differences between the
“sexes” instead of leaving what is to be deemed “natural” up to the subject herself.
Let us not lose hope too quickly, for whatever has been naturalized can always be
denaturalized. Freud himself is unambiguous in his refutation of and the necessity of bracketing
off cultural norms from psychoanalytic investigation into the nature of sexual difference, an
endeavour he would no doubt characterize as “scientific”: he insists in the Three Essays on the
Theory of Sexuality (1966)30, as Alenka Zupančič (2012) notes, that
The auto-erotic activity of the erotogenic zones is…the same in both sexes, and owing to this
uniformity there is no possibility of a distinction between the two sexes such as arises after
puberty…Indeed, if we were to give a more definite connotation to the concepts “masculine” and
30

Originally published in 1905.
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“feminine,” it would even be possible to maintain that libido is invariably and necessary of a
masculine nature, whether it occurs in men or in women and irrespectively of whether its object is
a man or a woman (p. 7).

Freud (1966) himself further reinforces the sexual ambiguity of pre-adolescence in a footnote in
the Essays, in which he warns explicitly that it is “essential to understand clearly that the
concepts ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine,’ whose meaning seems so unambiguous to ordinary people,
are among the most confused that occur in science” (p. 141).
Nevertheless, Irigaray (1996) insists on the biological dimension of sexual difference:
Between man and woman, there really is otherness: biological, morphological, relational. To be
able to have a child constitutes a difference, but also being born a girl or a boy of a woman, who
is of the same or the other gender as oneself, as well as to be or to appear corporeally with
differing properties and qualities (p. 61).

Not only does Irigaray fail to couch her discussion of the maternal with the caveat that the
biological ability to bear children not the universal mark of a woman but, through her premature
desire to identify the pre-subject as a boy or a girl in advance of the processes of subjectivation
and acculturation which produce sexed subjects, she falls victim to a metaphysical essentialism
that cuts off the fruitful futural potentiality of the insight that one’s relationship to nature must be
cultivated instead of given by limiting the abundance of agency available to subjects as they
undergo and enact those processes of cultivation which mould and shape them into men or
women.
As we have seen, Irigaray is well aware that the process of sexing does not end but only
begins at birth. What she fails to perceive, however, is the extent of the multiplicity of
trajectories open to the subject who must cultivate her identity in relation to her embodiment. But
she fails to recognize that the possibility of altering one’s sexual anatomy does not detract from
her fundamental view of ontological difference in any meaningful way but merely amplifies the
number of available developmental trajectories open to the subject. She fails to deconstruct the
uncritical assumption that the “differing properties and qualities” of corporeal bodies, which do
very well exist, should be accepted as unchangeable aspects of human embodiment. The
underlying imperative of ontological difference can be left intact even while the imperative of a
specific and singular relation between the sexed subject and the body into which s/he was born is
exploded. The subjective and objective “irreducibility…of the sexes to one another” (Irigaray,
1990, p. 62) on which Irigaray too often insists need not imply the foreclosure of total variability
in sexed identification among individuals, including those born with similar bodies. The notion
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of ontological sexual difference, in short, does not foreclose transsexual and transgender
identification.

4

Gender and Time: From Queer Temporality to Trans Temporalities
4.1

Chapter Breakdown

If there is one thing universally applicable to the human condition, or essential to any attempt
to describe the human experience, it is arguably that our existence seems to be ubiquitously and
inescapably filtered through a constant interaction and negotiation with the concept we call
“time.” Time is caught up and intertwined with aspect of our existence, including the experience
and interpretation of gender and sexuality, both in ourself and others. I am not speaking about
time as an abstract principle but as a subjective condition of experience. Indeed, without the
subjective experience of time, gendered experience would have no order or meaning, no
underlying chronology or organizing logic, normative or nonnormative. Thus, the phenomenon
of gender is inherently temporal. As such, we will now shift from dealing with the theme of
ontology to an extended exploration of the theme of temporality, and how it affects the
development and perception of gender identity, and perhaps even sex itself, in ourselves and our
fellow human beings.
Time is a polysemic phenomenon. It has been the source of wonderment and debate in
academic thought from antiquity to modernity, and in the contemporary arena the concept of
temporality continues to serve as a central area in which theorists set out to revise and reinterpret
the assertions of their predecessors. Scholars in the humanities tend to emphasize time’s
inextricable relation both to the historical subject and to the subjective interiority of the living
subject – i.e. to the inescapable fact of embodied subjectivity that invariably mediates our
experience of the objective world in which we reside as conscious human beings.
Since antiquity, some philosophers’ models of time have been based on the necessity of
reckoning with death. From a Heideggerian perspective, the motivation and impetus for human
action are impacted by our inescapable awareness of the “horizon of death”; any action or
activity on the part of Dasein – “the entity which we are ourselves” – “is always essentially
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ordered by anticipation of the end that is ‘the most extreme possibility’ and that constitutes the
originary temporality of existence,” namely its own death (Stiegler, 1998, p. 5, emphasis mine).
As one grapples with the notions of time or duration, s/he is eventually and inevitably pushed
toward the existential realization of mortality. One may choose to embrace this fact: Plato’s
Socrates, to use a well-known example, did not hesitate to entertain the possibility that death
involved the cessation of consciousness, but many choose to reject it.
Introspective contemplation of the temporal harbors the potential to incite one to adopt an
attitude of denial in relation to the finality of death, causing him or her to cling fervently and
faithfully to a belief in the indefinite duration of an afterlife. Indeed, the most potent strategy for
coping with the reality of human finitude, and the one most commonly employed by individuals
and cultures the world over, as evinced by the content of numerous scriptural texts, has been to
posit an absolutely divine being who/force which stands outside of time and, as such, wields the
power to grant eternal life. This transcendent model of time has the dual effect of producing a
conceptual division between mind/body (or psyche/soma)31 and ameliorating the constraints of
time on the body through the promise of eternal conscious life after the organic death of the
finite body32.
Time and temporality cannot always be used interchangeably; rather, there exists a
conceptual distinction between “time” in the quotidian sense (often referred to as “clock-time”)
and temporality as such (a category which, first and foremost, refers to time as the fundamental
condition of possibility for being but can also refer to the state of existing within or having some
relationship with (and/or, paradoxically, being radically indistinct from) time on the part of
individual subjects. For although mortality, through a theological lens, ostensibly guarantees the
possibility of an eventual exit from earthly forms of suffering which rely on the sufferer’s
experience of time in terms of duration and repetition, this does not mean we can so easily
escape the recognition of time qua temporality as a fundamentally constitutive force, and as the
very condition which must always already be assumed in order for the notion of being, each
linguistic formulation of which necessarily implies an intrinsic spatiotemporal situatedness (i.e.
being-in-the-world, being-in-time), to carry any weight.
Lea Melandri (2019) describes this divide as a “split” between what she calls the “thinking being” on
the one hand and the “body-as-object” in Chapter One of her book, Love and Violence: The Vexatious
Factors of Civilization (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2019).
32
See Plato’s Apology of Socrates.
31
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As we will soon discover, furthermore, time does not necessarily have to be conceived as
(and certainly should not be presupposed to be) totally distinct from Being, and therefore to
describe an enworlded being as existing (or be-ing) in time could be viewed as technically
untenable, at least in certain contexts. Incidentally, within the context of our analysis it is
important to note that time is linked ideologically to sexuality via the cultural imperative of
reproduction. Heterosexual reproduction constitutes the grounding narrative for both history and
futurity. In my analysis of Martin Heidegger’s treatment of the interrelated themes of temporality
and historicality in his opus Being and Time in tandem with Immanuel Kant’s writings on time in
his monumental text, the Critique of Pure Reason, I endeavour to demonstrate that the temporal
bears a necessary relation to the ontological, as well as to deconstruct a monolithic concept that
has historically been inextricably intertwined with the themes of time and history, namely
teleology, for the purpose of debunking a commonly held faith in the teleological nature of
development as it pertains to the existential subject. In doing so I maintain a sharp underlying
focus on the ubiquitous existential phenomena of sex and gender, which enable a smooth
introduction to the emergent notion of “queer temporality” as it relates to the aforementioned
themes of temporality, ontology, history, and teleology.
This broader framework informs my subsequent close analysis of some of the divergent
conceptualizations of trans temporalities (a phrase which alludes to the diverse range of
temporally saturated experiences associated with gender transition and sex reassignment) carried
out in relation to a number of real and fictional trans narratives – from former decathlete Caitlyn
Jenner to the transsexual protagonist of Imogen Binnie’s queer/trans novel Nevada (2013). This
final portion of the chapter will also address a fundamental tension which often arises in queer
theoretical discourse, namely the one between sex and/or gender essentialism and the notion of
fluidity or ‘flexibility.’ This tension will become readily apparent as we tease out the points of
divergence between the often-conflated signifiers, “transsexuality” and “transgender” – and,
correspondingly, between the traditional concept of binary transsexuality and what Talia Mae
Bettcher terms the “transgender paradigm.”

4.2

The Indissoluble Union of Gender and Time
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From an existential phenomenological perspective, gender and sexuality can be described
as modalities of being. Relatedly, time is the abstract condition of possibility for the very notion
of being: one cannot exist in a vacuum; to exist or to be we need time and space—which, at the
quantum level, are one and the same thing (i.e. spatiotemporality)—in which to do so. Not only
are all beings, human and nonhuman, suspended in the vast expanse of what we call time, but we
can also posit the existence of a plethora of distinct and unique times, or temporalities, insofar as
the term temporality can be made to refer to “the social patterning of experiences and
understandings of time” (Amin, 2014, p. 219). Hence temporality is not a universally applicable
organizational framework for gendered subjectivity. It is a much more expansive and
multiplicitous concept than that. Temporality has a double meaning in our context: it refers not
only to the state of existing within time, usually conceived as a linear progression of past,
present, and future, but also our intimately subjective relationships to time, which do not always
square with the common expectation of progressive linearity.
Notably, temporality never ceases to be an indispensable aspect of every instantiation of
gender performativity, though it is no longer an exclusively linear conception of temporality with
which we are dealing. Time is indispensable to gender insofar as the stylized acts which
constitute gender, or rather produce and uphold the cohesive illusion thereof, must be carried out
repeatedly to bolster the perception that one’s gender identity constitutes an innate, essential, and
permanent aspect of one’s being. But to the keen eye, the unavoidably temporal quality of gender
betrays the illusory constructedness of static gender identity. Butler (1990) troubles the notion
that gender is a static and unchanging feature of human existence (and concomitantly the
naturalness and originality of gender) by mobilizing a philosophical critique of unified
subjectivity. In the first chapter of Gender Trouble she asserts that “gender is not a noun, but
neither is it a set of free-floating attributes…gender proves to be performative—that is,
constituting the identity it is purported to be” (Butler, 1990, p. 25). “In this sense,” she writes,
“gender is a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed”
(Butler, 1990, 25). She then goes on to quote Nietzsche’s claim in On the Genealogy of Morals
that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added
to the deed—the deed is everything” (Butler, 1990, p. 25).
In addition to Nietzsche, Butler’s early work also relies heavily on Foucault and his
exposure of the productive and constitutive aspect of power over and against the erroneous, or at
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least parochial, emphasis on the strictly repressive function of laws and norms, such as those
governing sexuality in Western society and culture. Foucault’s writings help to clarify that the
true function of the discursive and regulatory norms which govern sex and sexuality is, in short,
not to repress but to constitute. The Foucaultian insight regarding the blurred lines between
repression and constitution can also be expressed in terms of a distinction between being and
becoming, a dichotomy which, originating in ancient Greece in the thought of Heraclitus, would
continue to plague the metaphysicians for centuries to come. For our purposes, however, the
distinction between being and becoming naturally raises the question of subjectivation: the
process by which one becomes a subject. Butler throws into question numerous attributes of
subjectivity that went unchallenged during the reign of the Enlightenment subject, namely the
qualities of unity, freedom, autonomy, and rationality. Because gender is largely socially
constructed and sexed subjects are inherently discursively saturated, the possibility for agential
transgression or subversion is opened up, especially for marginalized and oppressed subjects.
Once the universal subject of the eighteenth century is put into question, the way is paved
for an alternative definition of temporality—one more commensurable with concepts such as
rupture, contingency, fragmentation, and nonlinearity than with unity, universality, cohesiveness,
and linear progression. Hence, we can begin to sense the emergence of a salient connection
between the temporally imbued ontological distinction between being and becoming and the
metaphysical tension between the two common models of trans ontology, the first of which
appeals to the idea of a native gender identity and the second of which emphasizes the
construction of identity as a temporal process (which will be represented by author Imogen
Binnie and trans theorist Atalia Israeli-Nevo respectively).
Butler boldly rejects the expressive model of sex/gender, which is predicated on the
assumption of some essential core which exists independently of the way one behaves, in favour
of the now-famous performative model in which gender consists, both conceptually and
materially, precisely and only in the vast and diverse range of stylized acts which we commonly
(uncritically and erroneously) believe to be expressions of some underlying and invisible
gendered essence within the subject who performs them. Moreover, she takes this initial insight a
step further in the early pages of Gender Trouble, daring to consider the implications of the
possibility that not only gender but sex, too, might be a discursive construct rather than a cut and
dry biological reality. This opens up the radical notion that sex cannot be objectively determined
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or verified at any one point in time (let alone singularly maintained throughout the course of
variably embodied sexed subjects’ lives) due to its imbrication, owing to the status of ‘sex’ as a
discursive category, with a host of historically and culturally contingent factors, not to mention
the myriad physiological ambiguities shrouding the clinical determination of sex at birth.
Butler’s interventions in traditional feminist discourse at the close of the twentieth
century productively split open the pragmatic and didactic binary between gender and sex which
originated (and there is some uncertainty dispute regarding its precise historical origin in relation
to demise of the ancient one-sex model) sometime after the eighteenth century.33 From a
Butlerian perspective, gender is not a biological given, but a processual phenomenon enacted
over time. In this vein, Butler (1988) explicitly asserts, before the publication of Gender Trouble,
in “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist
Theory,” that “gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts
proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time—an identity instituted through a
stylized repetition of acts” (p. 519).
While series of constantly repeated acts or behaviours may congeal over time to produce
the appearance of a stable gender identity, we must keep in mind that the performative model
critically exposes the inherent instability of gender over and against the commonly accepted
expressive model of gender. The mere appearance of gender as the outward projection of a static
and enduring essence does not necessarily imply the existence of such an essential entity beneath
the appearance. Similarly, the mere appearance of autonomous action does not guarantee the
capacity for unrestricted freedom of action on the part of the acting subject. As one might
surmise, therefore, what is at issue for Butler is not merely the conceptual tenability of gender
essentialism but the very unity of the embodied subject – the being whose discrete individuality
might culminate in a locus of agency which would constitute the condition of possibility for the
subversion of identity. Furthermore, agency remains a prerequisite to the capacity for subversion
whether one believes in the universal possession of innate or intrinsic personal gender identity or
subscribes to a purely social constructivist interpretation of the Beauvoirian maxim “[o]ne is not
born, but rather becomes, woman” (Beauvoir, 2011, p. 283). In any case, neither sex nor gender
can be totally reduced to either biology or cultural construction. This line of argumentation has
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been demonstrated elsewhere by numerous feminist biologists.34 But we have not the space here
to analyze such debates in any detail. Instead, I would like us to consider the complex
relationship between temporality and gender variance in what follows.
As it happens, the regulation of temporality is one major avenue through which
heteropatriarchal structures of power accomplish the maintenance of the deeply entrenched
cultural norms of heteronormativity and cisnormativity at the affective and personal level of
subjectivity. Specifically, it is evident in narratives such as that of Caitlyn Jenner—who,
referring to a photograph depicting her former self, a male-identified decathlete, declares “That
is me, that is her,”—that we as sexed subjects make sense of our intimate experiences of gender
by bestowing them with a sense of temporal order. Interestingly, the form of Jenner’s claim
leaves ambiguous whether or not she was fully conscious of her native femininity at the time the
picture was taken. Regardless, although the ascription of innate femininity onto her past has the
potential to be ‘read’ as a retrospectively constructed narrative, the truth or falsity of such a
reading would be irrelevant even if it were objectively verifiable. What matters most is that the
articulation of such a narrative must and does occur in accordance with the prevailing cultural
understanding of time as coextensive with progressive linearity. Her explicit attribution of
internal femininity to her previous embodied self, which was at the time universally read and
understood as masculine and male to the outside world, affirms the dominant paradigm of
temporality as progressive linearity—a paradigm inextricably linked to the orderly, consecutive
temporality which underpins normative psychosexual developmental trajectories and the
exclusionary norms of cisnormativity and heteronormativity. And to be sure, she has every right
to subscribe to that model of temporality.
To recap, I have clarified here that the concept of gender refers to nothing more concrete
than a series of acts attributed to a single subject which together cement the illusion of a fixed
identity over time. However, this implies that gender also has the potential to be otherwise than a
static entity. The fact that we have to constantly perform our gender to maintain it, and police
others’ gender expressions to guarantee the societal dominance of cisnormativity, means that
individuals can also subvert dominant norms. But can subversion be overemphasized? Can
counter-hegemonic subversion of gender and sexual normativity mutate until it has unwittingly

34

See Fausto-Sterling (2000); see also Fausto-Sterling (2012); see also Ah-King & Nylin (2010).

55
accrued a hegemonic status which resembles the very dominant paradigm it set out to resist and
oppose? Where do calls for the eradication of binary gender leave transsexuals who assert that
gender identity corresponds to a metaphysically innate gender—one which has been present
since birth—or a deeply embedded desire to transition so that his or her aspired gender can be
achieved through somatic transition?

4.3

Dasein: A Temporal Being

I begin this section with an examination of the groundbreaking phenomenological
conception of time in relation to human being delineated by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time
before subsequently considering its points of connection to the treatment of temporality by
Immanuel Kant in his system of transcendental idealism. The overview just mentioned, of two of
the more influential contributions to the theorization of time in the recent history of the
philosophical tradition, will then serve as the backdrop against which I launch my discussion of
queer temporality and my subsequent close investigation of multiple unique and specifically
trans temporalities, both fictional and autobiographical (which is preceded by a more in depth
discussion of the temporal nature of gendered subjectivity via Butler’s theory of performativity).
Michael Wheeler (2018) sums up Heidegger’s influential notion of Dasein – which is
itself a transfiguration of Husserl’s postulation of an irreducible thinking subject who serves as
the grounds for all objective inquiry (often referred to under the moniker of “transcendental
subjectivity”) – as “the inherently social being who already operates with a pre-theoretical grasp
of the a priori structures that make possible particular modes of Being.” As it pertains to the
concepts of time and temporality specifically, Dasein is the entity which exists, precisely and
only, between the two poles of enculturation (or ‘birth’) and finitude (or ‘death’). The being of
Dasein stretches out across the distance between enculturation and finitude, which together
comprise the conditions of possibility for Dasein’s unique, enworlded and embodied experience
of temporality as an existential phenomenon rather than simply a matter of objective relativity or
linearly sequential chronology.
Although counterintuitive from a strictly scientific or historical perspective, this latter
insight becomes all the more evident when we recall the principal defining characteristic of
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Dasein, namely that Dasein is a (or the) being for whom existence, or Being, itself, is always at
issue (or an issue). In short, Dasein’s essence is identical with its inherent sense of comportment
in relation to its Being, which is defined by the potentiality it harbors, at every moment, to take
up a vantage point, as if from outside itself, on its own Being). Following its ‘birth’ (not a
biological birth but an existential one) into a pre-existing culture, Dasein assumes its place in the
world as a creature fundamentally indistinct from culture in an ontological sense and yet,
simultaneously, thrust into an extrinsic cultural realm not identical with its being, from which
there is no escape – indeed, even death, in its unlimited finality, offers not a true escape insofar
as the event of death relegates Dasein to non-existence – a realm (culture) whose norms,
customs, and rites of passage cultivate in Dasein distinctly other-directed, non-solipsistic modes
of thought.
In any case, despite the predominance of the scientistic tendency to conflate the notion of
time as a whole with the strings of temporally ordered events that comprise a human lifespan, a
historical society, and civilization as a whole, or even for that matter the unimaginable series of
moments which constitute the “age” of the extant universe itself, is to falsely attribute to it an air
of objectivity which the term by no means deserves. Furthermore, even to include in one’s
mathematical quantification of time those potentially infinite durations, or ‘infinities,’ which
presumably (must have) elapse(d) before one is born and (will occur) after s/he dies – which,
incidentally, are at once conceptually multiple and discrete and yet at the same time boundless in
scope, continuous, and unending – or, indeed, even to account for nuanced variables such as the
constantly expanding nature of the universe, would not, from an existential phenomenological
perspective, redeem any formulation of time that renders it as an indefinite succession of distinct
moments inasmuch as the very notion of succession bears little relevance to phenomenological
interrogations of the various and variegated subjective experience of time, or ‘temporality.’
In short, the quantitatively based notion of time-as-linear-succession (or clock-time)
differs dramatically in kind from a qualitatively attuned conception of temporality as a subjective
phenomenon experienced by a living subject, opening the door to temporalities which may, for
instance, be deemed ‘queer,’ or ‘heterosexual/straight,’ among a multitude of other qualitative
descriptors pertaining to the subjective, experiential nature of temporality within the purview of
phenomenological investigation. We will address this in greater detail later. We now find
ourselves in a position to assert with some confidence that time is irreducible to mere succession
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and that, accordingly, to recognize the plethora of ways in which each of us uniquely experience
and interpret the phenomenon of temporality is to strike at the heart of what it means to be a
human being – that is, to be an embodied, enculturated, sexed, and gendered subject.

4.4

Heidegger’s Kantian Roots

The Kantian roots of Heidegger’s treatment of time should not be overlooked, for indeed,
striking resonances emerge between Heidegger’s and Kant’s theories of time in relation to
ontology. In fact, Wheeler (2018) goes so far as to suggest that “[t]he ontological emphasis that
Heidegger places on temporality might usefully be seen as an echo and development of Kant's
claim that embeddedness in time is a precondition for things to appear to us the way they do.”
“According to Kant,” he briefly remarks, “embeddedness in time is co-determinative of our
experience, along with embeddedness in space.” For Kant, temporality is not a concept that is
derived or abstracted from experience but rather constitutes a necessary a priori condition (along
with spatiality) for the experience of objects in the first place. While space for Kant represents
an a priori condition for our outer experience, time represents the a priori condition of our inner
sense. In his words, “[t]ime is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e. of the intuition of
our self and our inner state” (Kant, 1998, p. A33/B49).
Since Kant holds that all representations, even those of external sensible objects, count at
the most basic level as determinations of the mind, and therefore depend for their existence on
“inner sense,” he thus holds, similarly to Heidegger, that all appearances (phenomena)
necessarily take place within time. For the purposes of clarification on this point, “appearances,”
in Kantian parlance, can be correctly described as being “objects of representation” (Stang,
2018). Put another way, it might be said that appearances take place within representations. It is
for this reason that Kant is able to claim, in the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” that time is a
necessary representation while at the same time rejecting the notion that it is the result of
appearances:
Time is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general
one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time. Time is
therefore given a priori. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible. Appearances may, one
and all, vanish; but time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be removed
(1998, p. A31/B46).
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Thus, it is possible to represent time without ever abstracting from particular appearances.
Ultimately, Kant wishes to claim not only that time functions as the form of our
internality but that our experience of sensible objects takes on a pattern of succession, which he
identifies as an essential and inherent characteristic of time, and therefore of time. A fundamental
characteristic of time for Kant is that it is successive, whereas, on the other hand, spatiality is
characterized by its fundamental simultaneity; different times are not simultaneous but
successive. The assertion that different times occur in succession, and thus temporality can itself
be called “successive,” serves as an apodictic principle of time for Kant (1998, p. A31/B47).

4.5

Temporalizing

Heidegger’s treatment of time, however, differs significantly from Kant’s in that
Heidegger’s writings function to weaken the hitherto unquestioned link between time and
succession – a link that appears positively inviolable from a Kantian perspective. Heidegger
refrains from characterizing time as a succession of moments, throwing into question the
successive nature of past, present, and future. He distinguishes between originary temporality,
which he views as “authentic,” and inauthentic temporality, or “intratemporality.” The latter
refers to “abstract, homogenous, and alienated time” (which I have been referring to and will
continue to refer to as “clock-time”), a conception of time divorced from the fundamental and
primordial (authentic) “time of human experience” (Martineau, 2015, p. 4).35 Heidegger
implicitly rejects, in Being and Time, the notions of both clock-time (the idea that time is a
chronologically ordered, infinite succession of self-contained moments) and relativistic time (the
idea that time has only a relative existence reliant on and influenced by the motion of the
conscious observer and the distinctness of past, present, and future is therefore only a persistent
illusion). Considering that both of the above ways of viewing time erroneously portray time as a
“present-at-hand” phenomenon (meaning, essentially, a fully-fledged independent entity),
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Heidegger opts instead to characterize temporality as “an internal feature of Dasein's existential
constitution” (Wheeler, 2018). “According to Heidegger,” explains Wheeler (2018),
temporality is a unity against which past, present and future stand out as ecstases while remaining
essentially interlocked. The importance of this idea is that it frees the phenomenologist from
thinking of past, present and future as sequentially ordered groupings of distinct events.

In Heidegger’s (1962) own words:
Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a ‘succession’. The future is not later than
having been, and having-been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a
future which makes present in a process of having been (p. 401).

4.6

Historicality

Recognizing, as we now do, the incompleteness from an ontological perspective of
scientific formulations of temporality as reducible to measurable duration which necessarily
follows a chrono-linear pattern of succession, let us now mobilize this insight for the purposes of
interrogating the dominant historical-teleological connotations of the concept of “time.” Should
we not now find it equally necessary to reject tacit overestimations of the jurisdiction of History
as an organizing force in ontological matters by resisting the temptation to organize and
contextualize the passage of time in terms of events of significance for the development of
civilization, and in doing so equate time with chronology?
In deconstructing and dismantling the presupposition of chronological linearity with
respect to temporality, we thereby allow for the possibility of circumventing the closely related
notion of teleology, or rather subverting it given its hegemonic status. Indeed, not only have
queer and postmodern theorists found themselves driven by a sense of obligation to deconstruct
and dismantle the notion of chronology (due, for example, to the harmful nature of normative
narratives of psychosexual and/or physiological development of normal boys and girls predicated
on predeterminations regarding the purported existence of biologically intrinsic teleologies
specific to male and female human organisms respectively), but also and relatedly, postmodern
and queer theory has aimed, at long last, to dispose with finality of the historically coveted
notion of teleology.
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4.7

Queer Temporalities

A certain model of time as a concept reducible to linear progression stems from Platonic
philosophy and continues into the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and it is precisely this model which
the notion of queer temporality seeks to interrupt. Queerness is often seen as standing outside of
biological time (the ‘straight’ time of heterosexual reproduction and futurity). The queer subject
has been constructed as “stuck in the past,” developmentally arrested or stunted, unable to move
forward, and therefore recalcitrant to social, economic, historical, and even evolutionary norms
and standards of progress(ion). Queer theorists E. L. McCallum and Mikko Tuhkanen (2011)
suggest that “living on the margins of social intelligibility,” as is presumably the fate of many if
not all queer subjects, “alters one’s pace; one’s tempo becomes at best contrapuntal, syncopated,
and at worst, erratic, arrested” (p. 1). Tracing a theoretic-intellectual evolution from widespread
uncritical investment in the static ontological framework of classical Western metaphysics to the
advent of a queer hermeneutics of suspicion which gave way to critical and deconstructionist
methodologies that undermine the very notion of ontological stability by way of rejecting
conventional conceptions of identity as static, McCallum and Tuhkanen seek to resurrect what
they perceive as “Nietzsche’s radical impulse of appropriating history and temporality for the
moment” (McCallum and Tuhkanen, 2011, p. 3).
Accordingly, the two authors suggest that to formulate explicitly queer critiques of socalled “clock-bound” temporality is to mobilize oneself and one’s thought against the dominant
teleology of History—a conceptual category whose monolithic and totalizing influence
perpetuates the delusion that human beings (and nonhuman forms of life alike) are essential and
static entities. For such a position forecloses the possibility of understanding the temporality of
life—which inevitably encompasses the lived experience of gender and the sedimented identities
associated therewith—in relation to the myriad dynamic processes of becoming constitutive of
the phenomenon we refer to as “life,” but which bear no tangible relation to that linguistic
signifier. In what remains of this chapter I wish to raise the question of whether it is possible,
even likely, that increased recognition and acceptance of a plethora of modes of gendered
expression, including and especially those which fall under the umbrella of trans*, might
contribute to the Nietzschean revelation of a “mode of life liberated from baleful teleology”
(McCallum and Tuhkanen, 2011, p. 3). That gendered experience ranges from variable to
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consistent, and from ambiguous to definitive, provides one occasion to unsettle teleology by
embracing indeterminacy –at both the level of ontology and that of epistemology.
Moreover, considering the newly hypothesized (might we venture to say established?)
objective instability and non-stasis of personal identity, does not a total acknowledgment of selfdetermined identification productively fly in the face of the antiquated and outmoded
metaphysical telos to which Nietzsche supposedly directs his impassioned animosity? (A
gendered telos?) Gender cannot be determined as stable from the outside (empirical observation
is powerless in this instance; even cutting-edge endocrinology cannot provide philosophically
satisfying results) but nevertheless can be asserted as stable by the individual, and is indeed
described as such by some trans people (as evinced by the exemplary and highly publicized
narrative of Caitlyn Jenner’s transition).
Hence a paradox emerges: for such assertions can in some cases be understood
simultaneously as constituting a passive description of the very core of one’s existence and at the
same time as holding the power and potentiality to concretely shape and define that gendered
core. In other words, the act or process of communicating or expressing one’s self-identity
evinces the autonomous agential capacities s/he wields as an individual subject with respect to
her or his embodied self; yet in order to arrive at such self-knowledge, the subject must “look
inward,” taking on the role of observer with respect to her remembered past and her current
subjective state (a role which no one else is qualified to take on inasmuch as it requires a
singularly unique and inaccessible vantage point).
A major deadlock plagues the ostensibly progressive and inclusionary theories of queer
becoming insofar as many transsexual narratives (e.g. that of transsexual women who lay claim
to a ‘native’ sex) actually align more closely with a metaphysically essentialist account of gender
which we hastily took to be outmoded since it conflicts with social constructivist hypotheses
which privilege social gender while downplaying the category of ‘sex’ in order to emphasize the
supposed universal malleability and fluidity of gender insofar as it appears to be a social
construct. In light of this conceptual aporia, however, we must take pains to stress that taking
transsexual assertions of identity seriously, even and especially when they appear to reinforce a
binary model of gender as well as a seemingly untenable conflation of sex and gender (and thus a
return to the previous century’s paradigm of sex-gender), in no way undermines the
philosophical integrity of nonconventional approaches to the conceptualization and
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theocratization of gender, but on the contrary, only enriches gender and sexual difference as sites
of investigation.
As we have already seen, Butler (1990) alludes, well in advance of the birth of queer
theory as a distinct discipline, to the unintelligibility of a rigid distinction between biological sex
and social gender in the following, oft-cited quotation:
If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally
constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that
the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all (pp. 10-11).

Despite the problems with defining sex as a purely discursive effect (which, as we have seen,
Prosser makes abundantly clear in his reading of Gender Trouble) Butler’s point is an invaluable
one, and it contributed greatly to the tumultuous revolutions in gender theorizing set in motion at
the turn of the last century. Hidden in the above assertion, however, is not only an implicit
overestimation of the sovereignty of social construction in relation to the constitution of sexed
and gendered identities but also the threat of discounting the validity of personal identities which
complicate or disrupt the logic of social construction.
As the current century unfolds, I contend, the category of transsexuality represents an
increasingly necessary foil to the universalizing language of “transgender” which masquerades
as an adequate signifier in contemporary Liberal human rights discourses.36 Although it might
appear likely that a radically unrestricted acknowledgment of self-determined gender
identifications of any and all types serve to displace and unsettle the gendered teleologies of both
the scientific and sociocultural realms – two interrelated realms reinforce one another’s ‘truths’
to the point of constituting a normative, strictly binary epistemological model of gender which
possesses no identifiable origin – an insurmountable problem remains: namely that some
identities and narratives (which do not fit neatly into the normative confines placed on gender in
a culture but are at the same time not necessarily queer), such as those associated with classic
definition of transsexuality, rebelliously and inconveniently uphold precisely that
epistemological model. Although I am sympathetic to the McCallum’s and Tuhkanen’s (2011)
claim that “it is precisely [its] skewed relation to the norm that also gives queerness its singular
hope” (p. 8), the fact remains that the categories of ‘queer’ and ‘trans’ do not always exist in
symbiotic relation to one another. The vast symbolic and practical power of queerness with
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respect to advancing explicitly counterhegemonic and anti-normative theoretical and
sociopolitical objectives is precisely what Lee Edelman recognizes when he identifies
conservatism’s conception of the queer as being, however counterintuitively, the only
formulation which truly bears witness to the immense counterhegemonic power inherent to
queerness, its destructive potential against oppressive regimes which seek to impose social
norms on its subjects and instill faith in fictitious models of a rightful or natural social ‘order.’
Thus, it is all too easy to gloss over the often-tenuous relationship between queer theory
and trans theory and, correspondingly, the disharmonious, non-equivalent struggles and hopes
between those who identify as queer and/or nonbinary and those who identify as transsexual due
to radical and irresolvable dissensus of opinion regarding the value and necessity of
(straightforward) opposition to and/or rebellion against the norm. McCallum and Tuhkanen
(2011) regard reproduction (which they connect to the ambiguous notion of “fruitfulness” in
Nietzsche’s parlance) as the primary mechanism of historical progression. Thus, the Edelmanian
notion of reproductive futurity (a specialized term originating from the domain of queer theory
specifically) establishes the imagination of queer histories, presents, and imagined futures as a
legitimate theoretical pursuit, ensuring that queer theoretical investigations and rearticulations of
dominant history, analyses of the present, and predictions for the future cannot be pre-emptively
ignored on the basis of their supposed parochial preoccupation with fleshly desires, but must be
considered epistemologically valuable on the basis that an overdetermining, normative force like
reproductive futurism, which encapsulates and accounts for the ubiquitous impulse toward
reproduction (simultaneously an individual and sociocultural impulse), might subtly undergird
all recourse to the culturally coveted monolith of historicality itself.
And this intervention on the part of queer theory pollutes the long-standing societal and
academic perceptions of the study of abstract entities including history and time, removing the
disguises which allowed them to masquerade as pure and noble pursuits exempt from any
consideration of the perversely mystifying, all-too-human phenomenon of sexuality which,
irreducible to biology, endlessly complicates conveniently straightforward explanations
regarding the formation of civilization and the impetus of individual action. Advancing the
cultural normativization of heterosexual reproduction can be seen, without a doubt, as the single
most important task of that monolithic force, namely History, which wishes to coerce us into
complacency with the delusion of a teleology synonymous with linear progression. In contrast,
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queer conceptions of temporality can therefore be taken up as potent counterpoints to, or wielded
as weapons against, the blindly universalizing narrative of history-as-progress.
For History, when rigidly conflated with linear progress and the capitalistic aim of
development, functions as the antithesis to a dynamic and nonlinear conception of life, the latter
term signifying a dynamic, a-teleological phenomenon replete with stunted rhythms and
nonlinear trajectories, which may be termed “queer.” Such a conception of life can furthermore
only hope to thrive within a theoretical paradigm which does not merely tolerate but affirms and
encourages the disorienting oscillations between the unhistorical fervour of “youth” and the
suprahistorical overcoming of the past in favor of a still anti-futurian affirmation of the present
as a finality, which cultivate a uniquely queer modes of relating to, engaging with, and
describing, temporality. Indeed, inasmuch as “the notion of queerness [is] posited not as an
identity or a substantive mode of being but as a way of becoming,” in the words of McCallum
and Tuhkanen (2011), “temporality is necessarily bound up in the queer” (p. 8). Temporality is
thus also bound up in the gendered dimension of life, for cis and trans people alike.

5

Comparative Analysis of a Selection of Autoethnographic and
Autobiographical Trans Narratives
One is not born, but rather becomes, woman. (Simone de Beauvoir, 2011, p. 283)
I wasn’t born a trans woman. (Atalia Israeli-Nevo, 2017, p. 34)

5.1

Introduction

The question has been hotly debated in recent decades: does gender identity fall under the
category of discursive construction or can it be traced back to an intrinsic essence within the
subject? According to Butler’s (1988; 1990) famous theory of performativity, which has gained
somewhat of a dominant status in recent queer and feminist theory, temporality is a crucial
aspect of the performative enactment of gender. Butler’s core innovation is to expose gender as a
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linguistic and cultural construct, the coherence of which hinges on the non-volitional repetition
of its performance. Although the performative enactment of gender can easily be conflated with
expression, gendered performance does not, in fact, imply the necessary existence of an original
gendered essence or nucleus within the subject. Upon inspection, gender reveals itself to be a
metaphysically ambiguous and temporally dependent construct. Thus, the phenomenon we call
gender appears to be no more than a collection of actions habitually carried out by sexed subjects
and sedimented through repetition over time.
Yet the stylized manifestations which sustain its pervasive and illusory existence—the
subtle ways in which we are constantly ‘doing’ gender—nevertheless ubiquitously continue to be
dutifully performed, albeit often unconsciously or under a kind of duress. I will begin this, the
second and final part of my chapter on the theme of temporality by firmly establishing the
importance of temporality to gendered expression and performance. More specifically, a keen,
phenomenologically inspired observation of the unique temporality of gendered embodiment
constitutes a key aspect of Butler’s theory of gender performativity: the hypothesis that gender is
a psychologically ingrained construct insofar as such a notion entails that gender is not itself nor
does it not arise from a stable or static essence within the subject but relies for its coherence on
its repetition in time. Thus, I rely on but remain critical of Butler’s (1988) characterization of
gender as an “identity tenuously constituted in time—an identity instituted through a stylized
repetition of acts” (p. 519). throughout the remainder of the chapter to inform my investigation
of both the emergent concept of queer temporality broadly as well as the actuality of certain
specific trans temporalities insofar as the experience of temporality unavoidably mediates
diverse (linear and non-linear) trajectories of trans becoming.
I also introduce the useful analytical distinction succinctly articulated by Talia Mae
Bettcher in her article “Trapped in the Wrong Theory: Rethinking Trans Oppression and
Resistance,” between the “trapped in the wrong body” model, which aligns with conventional
epidemiological wisdom, and the “beyond the binary” model increasingly favoured by the
current Anglo-American political and epistemological “transgender paradigm,” in which (binary)
gender is thought to be wholly reducible to social construction.37 I outline this crucial distinction
to provide a strategic foundation for my rearticulation of the concept of “taking one’s time”

37

See Bettcher (2014), p. 385.
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outlined by Atalia Israeli-Nevo in “Taking (My) Time: Temporality in Transition, Queer Delays
and Being (in the) Present” whereby I claim that diverse agential manipulations of temporality
debunk the fantasy of a universally applicable narrative trajectory of transition and/or a unified
notion conception of trans temporality. I argue that the coexistence of such dissenting
perspectives on and narratives of gendered experience and identification is crucial to overcoming
the conceptual deadlock between fluidity and stasis which frequently arises in the context of
gender and sexuality studies.
In section 5.4, I embark on a comparative analysis of Israeli-Nevo’s transition story and
the fictional transition narrative of Maria Griffiths, the protagonist of Imogen Binnie’s
queer/trans novel Nevada (2013). Retaining a critical emphasis on the necessarily temporal
character of gender performativity in tandem with an acute awareness of Bettcher’s dichotomy
between the two major ways of conceptualizing trans ontology, I deal heavily in this section with
what has been posited by numerous contemporary theorists as the uniquely queer temporality of
gender and sexual nonconformity. In doing so I seek to illustrate how diverse and heterogeneous
trans temporalities complicate and disrupt not only the presupposed temporal unity of transition
but also the latent metaphysical presupposition of gender (i.e. masculinity or femininity) as an
innate and eternal aspect of the human being which has fuelled the crude conflation of sex,
gender and sexuality for centuries.
Israeli-Nevo complicates normative assumptions about sustained futural aspiration and
intense bodily dysphoria in trans subjects by choosing to embrace liminality and to resist the
imperative of linear progression. She does so through her deliberate abstention from conforming
to the expectations imposed upon (trans)feminine bodies, such as the removal of body hair, and
through her decision to take occasional breaks from the hormone treatments designed to guide
one’s process of somatic transitioning along a predetermined and highly medicalized trajectory,
thus disrupting the linear temporality of hormone replacement therapy (HRT). Similarly, Binnie
illustrates, in her literary work, a complex narrative of transition affected by normative
sociocultural demands. But a major point of difference unavoidably crops up between the two
texts, namely their respective characterizations of transness on the one hand as processual and
constructed and on the other as an essential and pre-existing component of one’s being since
birth. I suggest that this asymmetry reveals itself in the exemplary juxtaposition of Israeli-Nevo’s
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(2017) assertion, “I was not born a trans woman” and Maria Griffiths’ opposing assertion, “I
have been trans since I was a tiny little baby” (Binnie, 2013, p. 41).
Finally, I attempt to reconcile the tendency to valorize gender fluidity and/or flexibility
with the unavoidable and ineradicable existence of less obviously subversive forms of gendered
embodiment. For trans temporalities can, and often do, exceed the limitations of both the wrong
body and beyond the binary models, casting trans identification as a practice of discursive excess
for which dominant culture has no place. Indeed, it is precisely the attribution of excessive
ambiguity which relegates transness, within the heteronormative symbolic order (the realm of
language and culture), to a perpetual state of perceived temporal discontinuity and ontological
illegibility and leads to its designation as a culturally unintelligible form of pathological
difference. Although it may be justifiably asserted that the coexistence of Bettcher’s two
competing models leads to an irresolvable epistemological deadlock, Israeli-Nevo’s deliberate
decision to embrace the liminal tension between the two opposing models generates a productive
and liberatory manipulation of linear temporality without, however, falling victim to the
tendency to deify sexual and gender flexibility as inherently queerly subversive. In conclusion, I
argue that the widescale subjectivization of temporality enacted, in collective isolation, by trans
people as they navigate divergent experiences of transition liberates the concept of temporality
from the confines of both cisnormativity and transnormativity and forges an intermediary link
between the seeming rigidity of the wrong body model and the extreme fluidity of the beyond the
binary model, both of which have the untenable potential to acquire an almost hegemonic status.

5.2

Opposing Ontologies: Reconciling Seemingly Conflictual
Ontologico-Temporal Narratives of Transgender SelfDetermination and Discovery

“What gets dropped from transgender in its queer deployment to signify subversive gender performativity
is the value of the matter that most often concerns the transsexual: the narrative of becoming a biological
man or a biological woman (as opposed to the performative of effecting one)—in brief and simple the
materiality of the sexed body” (Prosser, 1998, p. 32)
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Susan Stryker (2004), in an article titled “Transgender Studies: Queer Theory’s Evil
Twin,” suggests that within the context of academic queer studies the signifier “transgender” has
been pushed into an all-subsuming role whereby it “increasingly functions as the site in which to
contain all gender trouble” (p. 214). In anticipation of the comparative analysis of two trans
narratives to be undertaken in section 5.4, I shall now briefly introduce Bettcher’s (2014)
distinction between what she calls the “wrong body” model of transsexuality and the “beyond the
binary” model. “The wrong body model proper has two versions,” she writes:
In the weak version, one is born with the medical condition of transsexuality and then, through
genital reconstruction surgery, becomes a woman or a man in proper alignment with an innate
gender identity. In the strong version, one’s real sex is determined by gender identity. On the
basis of this native identity one affirms that one has always really been the woman or a man that
one claims to be. In both versions, one is effectively a man or woman “trapped in the wrong
body” (p. 383).

In contrast, the revolution in trans theorizing and activism which began to gain traction near the
close of the last century “witnessed the introduction of the word ‘transgender’ as a broad
umbrella term” (Bettcher, 2014, p. 383). Bettcher (2014) claims that the new vision of gender
nonnormativity
subscribed to a ‘beyond the binary’ model. It claimed that because transgender people don’t fit
neatly into the two dichotomous categories of man and woman, attempts are made to force them
into this binary system. The medical regulation of transsexuality, in this account, is one of the
main ways that society tries to erase transgender people (p. 384).

It should be recognized, in any case, that femaleness is not synonymous with or
dependent on the implication of a specific type of personal history, nor on the general notion of
the past. Trans existence can be described in the same temporal terms as cisgender gendered
existence. A trans woman is both trans and a woman in the present moment, and the act of
emphasizing her transness does not have to mean emphasizing her past or a linear temporal
trajectory of her transition, even if her transition occurred along normative lines and was
temporally linear. Transness is a feature of present gendered existence. The phenomenon of trans
existence, like cis existence, does not require temporal contextualization in order to be, or be
seen as, valid or authentic. To focus on one's transness in its isolation can be done independently
of any focus on her past.
Furthermore, transness can be separated out analytically from womanhood or femininity.
Current trans identification – by which I mean the fact that one currently identifies as trans –
does not necessarily imply, in any way or to any extent, any specific details about one's past. The
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act of identifying as trans today does not imply or require that one has formerly occupied a body
commonly gendered as the opposite sex, was formerly perceived as the opposite sex (in everyday
life and in public or private settings), or that one formerly personally identified with a sex or
gender other than the one with which he, she or they identify presently. Rather, the precondition
for being trans is identifying as trans in the present, in the here and now. It is in this sense that
existence and identification, being and identifying, are inextricably intertwined when it comes to
the gendered aspect of trans, and of human, existence. I have no intention here of
employing/deploying trans identity abstractly as a disembodied figure of exceptionality, as
inherently transgressive38 nor as an abstract allegory of bodily transcendence39. Relatedly, I hold
– contra the numerous outmoded and conceptual frameworks of gender such as Butler’s (1990)
seminal model of ‘gender-as-drag,’ or Rosi Braidotti’s (2011) construction of the “transsexual
imaginary,”40 which she uses as “a floating signifier for the trouble with modernity” (Hayward,
2011, p. 227) – that no gender identity or form of gendered embodiment, including
transsexuality, should be fixed by the logic of exception – much less cast as the ‘exception’ par
excellence – to the culturally established and preferred norm of cis identity, which functions to
expose, or 'show up,' the constructedness of the norm itself – or indeed emblematic of the
contradictory and unsustainable nature of modernity itself.
The relative naturality or constructedness of gender norms, each of which is culturally
and historically specific, is peripheral to our present investigation. The looming dichotomy
between "natural" and "constructed" (nature/culture) ought to be superseded by the more
pressing issue of personal identification, and by the urgencies and complexities which undergird
the necessary labor of realizing, recognizing, and respecting (on both a broader sociocultural
level and an interpersonal one) the inviolable authority individuals ought to be assumed to
possess over their identities. To avoid the emergence of a deadlock between fluidity and rigidity
with respect to the conceptualization of gender identity, I claim, it is crucial to recognize that the
theoretical project of divorcing 'transness' from its common cultural association, if not conflation

Indeed, “[discourses] about trans-becoming [are] often delimited by the ways trans-identities resist or
‘transgress’ gender/sex categories” (Hayward, 2011, p. 227).
39
“Transsexuals do not transcend the body” (Hayward, 2011, p. 227).
40
“[T]he technological field has evolved into a space of sexual indeterminacy, which I rendered in terms
of a transsexual imaginary. Advanced capitalism has consumed and subsumed the old gender system”
(Braidotti, 2011).
38
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with, 'pastness41,’ can be done in simultaneity with the celebration of trans narratives that do
conform to normative expectations.
An innovation such as Susan Stryker’s notion of “pastpresents” – “an always present past
in the present” (Hayward, 2011, p. 236) – is indispensable in this regard insofar as it encourages
us to bracket the distracting question of whether trans-identification is “in fact” intrinsic to the
individual (in either an empirical, biological sense, a spiritual sense, or both) or a culturally
constructed identity category that derives meaning only oppositionally, viz. in relation to
cisnormative identities and identificatory practices. Such a notion could provide a theoretical
launching point from which to begin dispensing with the rigidity of the invisible boundaries
between individual subjectivity and social world(s), and to embrace the “sensuous transaction
between body and environment” (Hayward, 2011, p. 225), without ever sacrificing the possibility
of a robust defence of the ethical authority one possesses, to wield as she pleases, over her
identity on the basis of the self-avowal of subjective experience alone.
Thus, to wonder how you yourself, as a cis person or as a trans person, might interact
with your own gender in the absence of transphobia or hegemonic cultural gender norms – and of
course to assume the existence of such an interaction is to presuppose gender-as-a-concept, vis-àvis a general category called ‘gender’ that is separate from individuality or personhood, and then
to subsequently assume the necessity or inevitability of a tangible and quantifiable (conscious or
unconscious) personal relationship to it – is a separate consideration entirely from the ethical
question of whether one should be free to (or has a ‘right’ to) identify in this or that way
regardless of how they might actually choose to, or feel compelled to identify if she lived in a
world in which the conditions of reality were other than they currently are and historically have
been in our world.
Without doubt, there is much to discover and much to learn from engaging with the realm
of speculative inquiry on the topic of gender. We might ask ourselves, for example, “How might
While Sandy Stone (1992) evocatively critiqued “the ways transsexuality [is coerced into conforming]
to narratives of conversion [and of] lost history,” there are, of course, “counter narratives…about the
desire for passing, for finally being sexed or ‘at home in the body’” (Hayward, 2011, pp. 234-235). The
crucial thing to note in light of the potential discrepancy that might appear to arise between these two
seemingly disparate theoretical approaches – of seeking to liberate transness from the confines of a
temporally linear, absolutist, and relentlessly future-oriented model of sexual transitioning on the one
hand and of embracing the straightforward narrative model implied by the term “conversion” as itself
potentially liberatory and desirable on the other – is that they need not be seen as mutually destructive or
agonistic in relation to one another.
41
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my relationship to my gender identity and/or sex change in a trans-inclusive society?” Or, “What
gendered behaviours would I disavow or discontinue and which aspects of my gendered
existence/features of my gender identity would I seek to continue and/or reinforce?” Such
inquiries as these are captivating and indeed important to explore, but my goal here is quite
distinct and far less ambiguous: I aim to naturalize and defend one's freedom to identify how one
wishes (as male, female, other, or neither) regardless of the cultural conditions or constraints
operating on him/her/them with respect to the taxonomic procedures of gender assignment and
categorization, and the laws and norms governing how gender is expected to be or should be
performed and/or embodied.

5.3

A Preface to the Analysis of Nevada’s Literary
Narrativization of Transgender Experience

“I read transsexual narratives to consider how transition may be the very route to identity and
bodily integrity. In transsexual accounts, transition does not shift the subject away from the embodiment
of sexual difference but more fully into it” (Prosser, 1998, p. 6).

In juxtaposing the narrative of Imogen Binnie’s (2013) fictional text Nevada with the
personal narrative of Atalia Israeli-Nevo, I have no intention of conflating the articulation or
recollection of lived experience with the imaginative act of constructing a fictional narrative. I do
wish to highlight the capacity of literature with respect to its inherent socio-politically
transformative and revolutionary capacities, the capacious potentialities of the literary narrative
form with respect to its “political efficacy for imagining alternatives” (Cranston-Reimer, 2014, p.
34) – in our case, alternative ways of embodying and identifying with gender/methods of
gendered identification and embodiment.
As a society, it is important that we hear stories from real people, stories that are true-tolife, when attempting to address and assuage the social contention and hostility surrounding
issues of gender nonnormativity. It is also important that nondominant narratives of gender begin
to infiltrate other aspects of life, culture, and language – including, for example, the literary
realm – to inspire the indiscriminate perception of gender conforming and nonconforming
characters alike as human and as equals, as they are and should be considered in reality.
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Optimistically, one might reflect that a shift has been initiated in recent times in the very
possibility of imagining and articulating gender as a concept.
Accordingly, a vast range of possibilities of imagining and living-with gender that have
always existed but have only begun to be more widely recognized and celebrated in recent times,
also exist beyond the confines of quotidian life in the realm of fiction and storytelling, in which
dominant ways of articulating gendered experience have long prevailed to the exclusion of
nondominant alternative stories and trajectories of gendered experience. It would not be a stretch
to say that all literary genres involve some degree of political engagement with contemporary
reality, whether that engagement be direct or indirect. And this remains no less true when the
literary fictional work takes on the form of a personal autobiographical narrative, as does Imogen
Binnie’s Nevada. A great number of diverse gendered subject positions and gendered ways of
being exist both conceptually (as in the fictional world of Nevada) and concretely (as in the
multitude of real trans narratives including and in addition to the ones I reference) within and
outside of the dominant paradigm of gender (i.e. the cisnormative gender binary).
As such, those who occupy nondominant positions must navigate the dominant “world”
(or numerous “worlds”) of sense in which gender is strictly delimited and circumscribed in the
ways which we call ‘dominant’ or ‘normative’ or ‘hegemonic.’ However, such individuals also
can, and do, carve out and live in alternative “worlds” in which their identities are perceived
differently. In such worlds one may not only identify in different ways but might even be said to
possess different ontological attributes, the choosing or discovery of which may occur more
freely in the new “world” – as in the way Argentine feminist philosopher María Lugones (1987)
finds herself to be “playful” in some worlds and not in others.
While trans narratives of becoming are often excluded from or pushed to the margins of
mainstream discourses such as biology, we must remember and remain attuned to the fact that
Biology in its own right is a producer of narratives and scripts, of which dominant versions and
methods of interpretation exist paralogously to a plethora of nondominant authorial and
hermeneutical possibilities related to the articulation/trajectory of biological research, its
interpretation, and the often discontinuous and fragmented ways in which it gets picked up by
and rearticulated in the cultural imaginary, or ‘zeitgeist.’
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5.4

Comparative Analysis

Atalia Israeli-Nevo was not born a trans woman. Likewise, it took time for Maria
Griffiths, the transgender protagonist of Imogen Binnie’s (2013) queer/trans Bildungsroman,
Nevada, to discover her transness. Binnie (2013) describes Maria’s path to self-knowledge as a
process of connecting a “constellation of dots” which, viewed collectively, precipitated a shift in
her subjective experience of gender: “the sometimes I want to wear dresses dot…The oh man do
I get more fucked up than I mean to, every time I start drinking dot. The I might hate sex dot”
(5). She alludes to a long personal history of perpetual entrapment in a tormented affective state:
“for as long as she could remember, she had felt all fucked up” (Binnie, 2013, p. 5). It took time
for her confusion to crystalize into a state of definitive self-realization with respect to her identity
as a trans woman. Indeed, in a passage early in the novel she reminisces about teenage past in
which she “hadn’t figured out yet that she wasn’t [a boy]” (Binnie, 2013, p. 14).
Israeli-Nevo (2017) attests that she faced “enormous pressure” from both cis and trans
people to either “go on with” her transition or “forfeit this trans escapade” (p. 38). However, she
tells us that, instead of rushing herself, she resolved to embrace the liminality of physical
transition (Israeli-Nevo, 2017, p. 39). In contrast to the “classic” rubric of transition exemplified
by Caitlyn Jenner, whose path to public female identification bears points of connection to the
formulaic trappings of an “extreme makeover storyline,” Israeli-Nevo’s (2017) notion of “taking
time” encapsulates a range of deliberate ways of being (in the) present. “This is a mindful
embodied present,” she clarifies, “in which one has a chance to halt and delay his/her futural
aspirations regarding his/her identity and explore them” (Israeli-Nevo, 2017, p. 39). Recalling
McCallum’s and Tuhkanen’s (2011) remarks on queer temporality as “at best contrapuntal,
syncopated, and at worst erratic, arrested” (p. 1), it is easy to account for the formation of the
plethora of pathological diagnoses to which nonnormative bodies, subjectivities, and identities
have historically been susceptible. But the vast majority of (if not all) clinical or extra-medical
diagnoses and stereotypes related to “irregular” or “abnormal” psychosexual development,
whether perpetrated today or in the past, are predicated on the notion of a failure, or stubborn
refusal, to live up to numerous medically and socially constructed standards and expectations
that all harken back to conventional (i.e. cis-/hetero-normative) models or trajectories of
development laid out for the subject/body/person that have one thing in common: their reliance
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on a linearly progressive model of temporality. As such, does it not seem that what I am calling
“chrononormativity” could be, if not the root of the problem, then at least a significant barrier to
the attainment of free and unrestricted self-identification and self-actualization for all gendered
subjects?
In a similar vein, Israeli-Nevo (2017) respectfully appropriates Nasser Abourahme’s
notion of a “halted present”42 in which temporal markers become blurred and past and future
appear “more closed and yet more present” (p. 38). “We [trans people] are dissociated,”
continues Israeli-Nevo (2017) following her exegesis of the “halted present” hypothesis, “from
our bodies, our loved ones, and our general environment” (p. 38). Thus, her strategy of giving
herself time constitutes a reclamation of temporality from the margins; in taking her time she
wrests her experience of time from its capture by the heteronormative domain, disrupts the
normative tempo of linear progression, and enacts a refusal to acquiesce to the pathological
attribution of stunted development imposed by the agents of a hostile heterosexual matrix. These
agents are not abstract entities but employers who serve as the custodians of financial stability,
livelihood, and even survival, family members who can give or refuse loving care, and medical
professionals, including physicians and psychiatrists, the authoritative gatekeepers to hormone
replacement therapy and/or sex reassignment surgery.
Israeli-Nevo (2017) clearly suggests that she had to undergo a period of selfrealization/discovery regarding her already extant transness. Likewise, Maria, who did not
realize concretely that she was trans until she reached her twenties, describes a similar process of
gradual internal recognition in relation to her trans identity. Not only did Israeli-Nevo (2017)
have to discover her trans identity, but for her, the very fact of its hiddenness, its concealment
both from the outside world and from herself, entails, ontologically speaking, that she was not
always trans. Maria, on the other hand, asserts repeatedly throughout the novel that she has

Notably, Nasser Abourahme’s own discussions of temporality in terms of a stunted or “halted”
“present” emerge from his analysis of the failures of Palestinian revolutionary politics. Hence a
juxtaposition between the affective connotation of failure engrained in his notion of the halted present and
the myriad affective feelings of failure that can result from one’s embodied inability to live up to his/her
gendered aspirations (and/or cultural expectations of femininity or masculinity) proves fruitful in
uncovering points of connection between the melancholic affects shared by many gender variant subjects
and the somber solidarity in “failure” of ethnic minority citizens oppressed by an occupying force. See
Abourahme (2020); see also Abourahme (2014).
42
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always been trans (Binnie, 2013, p. 9; Binnie, 2013, p. 41; Binnie, 2013, p. 42; Binnie, 2013, p.
127).
I have been trans since I was a tiny little baby. Whether it was something in my brain from before
I was born, like people argue sometimes, or it was something I picked up developmentally after I
was born, like other people argue sometime, or whether somebody sexually abused me and then I
repressed the shit out of it and then that repression transmogrified into transsexuality, as some
other folks will argue, who fucking cares (Binnie, 2013, p. 41).

The above passage in particular powerfully illustrates a crucial point of difference between the
two trans narratives. On the one hand, Binnie’s (2013) portrayal of fictional protagonist Maria
serves, however subtly or inadvertently, to reinforce the metaphysical essentialist claim that trans
identity is an innate and original aspect of oneself, whereas Nevo does not. Incidentally, although
Nevada’s narrator clearly states that Maria has been trans “since [she] was a tiny little baby” (p.
41), she qualifies this assertion shortly thereafter by stating that took time to recognize her trans
identity despite the fact that, as a trans person, “you are supposed to have known you are trans
since you were a tiny little baby” (p. 42).43 In another passage midway through the novel, Maria
manipulates (or queers, in the verb sense) temporality by reimagining her teenage past, a time
before she had identified, or rather discovered, her transness: “She’s sixteen, but she’s the right
sex this time, and it feels mostly liberating and exciting but also a little sad” (Binnie, 2013, p.
125). Her use of the phrase “the right sex” in this quotation is illustrative of a particular
ontological position in relation to her gender identity, one that is not temporally dependent but a
seemingly atemporal and absolute aspect of one’s gender identity deeply entrenched in her being.
It is evident, in short, that Maria believes the innermost dimensions of her being to be, and to
always have been, completely shot through with transfemininity, viz. with both transness and
femininity. As a younger child, Maria “didn’t know she was trans, she couldn’t put into words
that she was a little girl, but she did know that something was horribly wrong and she blamed
herself for it” (Binnie, 2013, p. 127). In spite of her former existential naivety, it is
retrospectively clear to her, looking back, that she was nonetheless decisively and categorically
trans throughout her younger years. Her transness has no identifiable causal origin. It simply is.
It was not something which suddenly came into being from within at a certain stage in her

Note that we can map the aforementioned distinction between the “strong” and “weak” versions of the
wrong-body model delineated by Bettcher onto these opposing perspectives: Maria’s narrative
corresponds to the former while Israeli-Nevo’s is more commensurable with the latter.
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psychosexual development, nor something engendered by an external force. It was there all
along in one form or another, merely waiting to be discovered and properly articulated.
Importantly, neither Binnie nor Israeli-Nevo is more “correct” than the other. One
perspective does not, and cannot, emerge victorious over the other, or any other for that matter,
lest the sphere of trans politics devolve into a state of irresolvable divisiveness. Hence, I claim
that the dogmatic will-to-truth so often demanded by dominant culture, with its insatiable desire
for epistemological certainty and/or validity, must be subordinated to the unconditional validity
of acts of constative self-identification, even and especially when they appear to be conflictual.
We must refrain, I claim, from hierarchizing the various theoretical postulations regarding the
precise origin of the elusive and ambiguous notion of (trans)gender identity. We must make
room for a diverse assemblage of trans narratives to speak on their own terms, with their socalled logical contradictions in full view.
In foregrounding Israeli-Nevo’s (2017) autobiographical narrative of transfeminine
transitioning, I have aimed to demonstrate the quasi-hegemonic status of “progressive linearity”
in what she dubs “classic” trans temporalities, namely those which accede to the normative
cultural demand for the renunciation of past identities in favor of forward oriented and
unambiguously “complete” narratives of gender/sex transition. I argue that, by radically
embracing the liminality of transition and refusing to validate the demand for such narrative
homogeneity, Israeli-Nevo (2017) opens a horizon of alternative possibilities to conventional or
“classic” conceptualizations of trans temporality. Moreover, she validates the viability of
embracing liminality and ambiguity in the temporal present without in the same stroke
discounting the value of transition narratives which do appear to conform to normative
expectations.

6

A Mobilization of María Lugones’ Notion of Ontological Pluralism

6.1

“World”-Travelling
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In “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception,” María Lugones (1987)
emphasizes that the “failure of love” that exists between individuals and groups and those whom
they view as ‘other’ – such as the failure of some white/Anglo women to love women of color –
“lies in part in the failure to identify” (p. 8). She intends here to evoke the possibility of
authentically “identifying” with others while retaining the solidity of one’s own identity. She
hints at the importance of attempting to see the world through another’s eyes does not necessitate
that one severs any aspect of the connection which binds her to her own perspective(s) or
worldview(s). Instilled in the psyches of many white/Anglo women is the problematic
unconscious or not-quite-conscious conviction that to afford solid identities to their sisters of
color would threaten to dissolve or diminish the solidity and/or stability of their own identities. “I
am profoundly dependent on others,” Lugones (1987) writes, “without having to be their
subordinate” (p. 8). “We are fully dependent on each other for the possibility of being
understood and without this understanding we are not intelligible” (Lugones, 1987, p. 8). She
suggests that the practice of “world”-traveling can engender the cultivation of a unique and
undertheorized form of identification with others (specifically other women), one that does not
erode the independence of either subject in a given encounter or dynamic. To travel to another
woman’s “world,” to “see with her eyes,” allows one to identify with her as an/Other, as separate
from oneself, in a way that does not imply subordination or dependency.
Although Lugones (1987) is reticent to assign a static definition to the notion of a
“world,” citing what she views as the “suggestiveness” of the concept, she describes what she
means by “worlds” in some detail. A “world” can be a society – “an actual society”; however,
the same society viewed through various and distinct lenses of personal experience can at once
be constitutive of multiple different “worlds” (Lugones, 1987, p. 10). She says concretely,
furthermore, that “for something to be a ‘world’ in my sense it has to be inhabited at present by
some flesh and blood people,” thus foreclosing any possibility of the term’s conflation with the
future-oriented and phantasmatic notion of ‘utopia’ (Lugones, 1987, p. 9). “A ‘world’ in my
sense may be an actual society given its dominant culture’s description and construction of
life…But a ‘world’ can also be such a society given its non-dominant construction” (Lugones,
1987, 10). At the same time, a “world” need not refer to the (dominant or non-dominant) cultural
climate or ethos of a “whole society” but may also refer to that of “a tiny portion of a particular
society” (Lugones, 1987, p. 10).
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Put simply, a “world” is a “construction of life.” “In a ‘world’ some of the inhabitants
may not understand or hold the particular construction of them that constructs them I that
‘world.’ So, there may be “worlds” that construct me in ways that I do not even understand”
(Lugones, 1987, p. 10). “Or it may be,” she continues – and this may be the point that has the
most relevance to our present investigation – that I understand the construction, but I do not hold
it of myself. I may not accept it as an account of myself, a construction of myself” (Lugones,
1987, 10, emphasis mine). “And yet, she concludes warningly, it is not impossible for one to be
“animating such a construction,” however inadvertently (Lugones, 1987, p. 10). She then moves
on to the crux of her theory with respect to its implications in the everyday/quotidian life of those
whose bodies reside within, but who at the same time are routinely cast out, relegated to the
margins of, and are forced to live (or choose to live) as ‘outsiders’ to, dominant society. And
dominant society must be understood as fundamentally capitalist, heterosexist, white
supremacist, cissexist in nature, with the further implication that all those who live within its
domain (which is to say, whose life itself is, without exception, constructed and sustained by
those same interlocking systems of oppression we just named) as an agent and representative of
that all-subsuming matrix of intelligibility which renders perceived-nonnormative or
nonconforming identities and persons unintelligible, both symbolically and actually.
Because of the fact that, as Lugones (1987) asserts, “[o]ne can ‘travel’ between these
‘worlds’ and one can inhabit more than one of these ‘worlds’ at the very same time,” it follows
logically that those who are/have been constructed as outsiders to mainstream society or culture,
or to a “dominant construction or organization of life,” can be identified, in Lugones’ parlance,
as “world travelers” (pp. 10-11). Whereas she herself offers the example of ethnic (Hispanic and
Latino) identity to illuminate her model of world-traveling and multiple ontologies, arguing that
“[o]ne can be at the same time in a ‘world’ that constructs one as stereotypically latin [sic], for
example, and in a ‘world’ that constructs one as [simply] latin” (Lugones, 1987, p. 11), I intend
to demonstrate how another form of personal and/or collective identity, namely gender identity,
can be seen to be equally relevant and applicable to this model.
Specifically, I would like to introduce one socioculturally marginalized identity that I
believe, taking my lead from prominent trans theorist and philosopher Talia Mae Bettcher, also
aligns quite seamlessly with the intersectionally oriented theory of “world”-travel under
development by Lugones: transsexual identity. If one were to substitute “latin” identity for trans
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identity, for the sake of illustration, the next line of Lugones’ (1987) article would read as
follows: “Being stereotypically [trans] and being simply [trans] are different simultaneous
constructions of persons that are part of different ‘worlds.’ One animates one or the other or both
[constructions] at the same time” (p. 11).

6.2

Travelling While Trans, or Traveling as an Ally

“Ask yourself if you can travel in our trans worlds. If not, you probably don’t get what we’re talking
about. Remember that we live most of our lives in non-transsexual worlds, so we probably do get what
you’re talking about.” (C. Jacob Hale, 1997)

Trans women are forced to live in and navigate a world that is directly and relentlessly
hostile to them on the basis of their identities and/or their bodily appearance. Such hostility is
unfortunately a hallmark of the current dominant trans-resistant cultural order, and as such
features prominently in the dominant “world” (or “worlds,” for there may be multiple) in which a
ubiquitously accepted narrow and exclusionary model of (binary) ‘gender conformity’ serves as
justification for the outright exclusion of trans women from ‘normal’ social life. In extremely
blatant instances of transphobic policy or rule-enforcement, trans women’s participation in
gender-specific activities, including in some cases the use of women’s washrooms, admittance to
‘women-only’ spaces, and accessing of feminized or ‘female-specific’ forms of health and
medical care, has been unjustly limited or even prohibited.
From an unapologetically anti-transphobic perspective, it is plain to see that any and all
such prohibitions have in common is that they stem from a misrecognition of trans women’s
identities as women. Trans women as a group are also disproportionately victimized by lethal
gender-based violence and made targets of transphobic hate speech, and with respect to this
issue, it is similarly straightforward to discern from a transfeminist perspective that at the
nucleus of such bigoted remarks resides the nonsensical notion, whether it remains implicit or is
directly asserted, that trans women are not really women. The assertion that a woman “is a
man”44 due to her possession, or assumed possession, of genitalia or bodily attributes commonly

44

This false assertion can be found woven into the writings of such widely celebrated and respected
feminist thinkers as Elizabeth Grosz, whose use of the masculine pronoun, “his,” in reference to
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gendered as masculine or male, is not only inaccurate but poses a threat to trans women’s
personal autonomy. It throws into question something that is always already in question for trans
women living in transphobic societies, namely their right to be viewed as competent agential
subjects worthy and capable of determining their own identities. Whether or not such a verbal
violation is followed by a violation of her bodily autonomy in the form of physical violence or
unwanted sexual or physical contact, the notion that a trans woman is, in any sense, more
“masculine,” or less “female,” than a cis woman is in actuality an absurd proposition.
The term “man” and the masculine subject position exist in antithetical relation to the
kind of gendered subject a transsexual woman is, ontologically and biologically, concretely and
abstractly, materially and symbolically, and therefore ought to be registered as simply incorrect
and inaccurate when and if it should ever be directed at her. A transsexual woman is a woman,
on the surface and at the very core of her being. She is woman and, if she wishes, female; she
participates in womanhood and femininity in the deepest and most superficial senses of her
ontological and material existence at the very same time. The signifier “man,” and actual flesh
and blood men, can serve, respectively, as symbolic of and representative of absolute alterity in
relation to trans women’s own gendered subject positions in precisely the same way that they
(“man” and men) serve that function for cis women.
The external judgment or evaluation of a trans person’s authentic or ‘real’ sex imposed,
hastily but with no less conviction, by the cisgender enforcer-of-hegemonic-gender-norms on the
basis of the trans person’s physical appearance (an assessment which relies on assumed
knowledge about the nature and shape of her genitalia, even though her actual genitalia are by no
means necessarily visible, rendering such ‘knowledge’ doomed to inaccuracy even if it were a
clue or indicator of sex, which, in and of itself, it is not; a penis can be female, and a vagina male
in tandem with the affirmation of the individual to whom such genitals are attached).
Without detracting from the extraordinary fruitfulness of the concept of “world”-travel –
for let us not forget that the practice of world-traveling a “matter of necessity and of survival” for
many (Lugones, 1987, p. 11) – I want to emphasize that although it is accurate to say that the
violence that characterizes hostile encounters between cis perpetrators of transphobic violence

transsexual women is not only abhorrently disrespectful but inexplicably runs counter to her own
emphasis on “the centrality of bodily knowledge for the formation of subjectivity” (Hayward, 2011, p.
234).
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and their trans or gender nonconforming victims (encounters of the type which plague North
American society on a level that can only be described as systemic) stems from an illogical
misrecognition of the nature of gender identity on the part of the perpetrator (and this is not only
a frustrating “mistake” but a cruel, inhumane and often lethal one), the failure to respect trans
women as women it is not only a logical misapprehension but an ethical failure. It constitutes a
failure, in an ethical sense, to set aside cultural biases regarding the necessary and/or requisite
conditions for female “category membership” and to instead apprehend the true nature of the
category of female or feminine identity: i.e. as a radically open and inclusive category. The
widespread and systemic phenomenon of transphobic violence, unsettling both in scope and with
regard to the extent of its cruelty, is compounded by the fact that misrecognitions of this type are
not recognized as harmful and incorrect but in fact perpetuated and protected by dominant
society, its institutions and its agents/figures of (legal, moral, etc.) authority, thus sheltering the
heinous actions of those who take it upon themselves to enforce gender conformity in others with
violence from unmitigated condemnation they rationally and objectively deserve and allowing a
regime of vigilantism to operate with relative impunity and in the absence of significant social or
legal obstacles. For these norms are always and without exception viewed as implicitly
inviolable norms of both conduct and appearance in cisnormative/trans-resistant society.
Whether we happen to be emphasizing the microcosmic interpersonal effects of
transphobia or the wider trend of transphobia in the systemic register, the phenomenon remains
rooted in an unwillingness, a refusal – one that is simultaneously collective and individual – to
expand and rework outmoded conventional understandings and definitions of womanhood and
femininity. At worst, this refusal is deliberate; at best it is unrecognized unacknowledged and
thereby invisibilized. To harbor the belief, silently or vocally, that a trans woman is anything but
a woman is, plainly and simply, to misapprehend the incontestable solidity of her self-given
gender identity, one aspect among others of her overall personal identity, over which she alone
presides and which no other party but she retains the authority to assert or ‘verify.’ To contest
one individual’s claim to femininity is, moreover, to discount the process of self-avowal in
general.
But when contextualized as the logical and inevitable consequence of a nearly ubiquitous
cultural sentiment of trans-resistance/transphobia, such a “mistake” cannot simply be remedied
by pointing out its irrationality or logical incoherency. For misrecognition in this context is
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bound up with and inseparable from a broader culture of violence and erasure predicated on the
oppression of trans existence itself, a culture predicated on the deliberate and systematic erasure
of trans lives and, arguably, heavily invested in a coordinated campaign of genocide against trans
bodies. Let me therefore state the following unequivocally: the misrecognition of identity is a
form of violence. This sentiment is as applicable to the phenomenon of institutionalized
transphobia as it is to that of transphobic hate speech and physical violence. The refusal to
recognize or accept one’s avowed gender identity, whether perpetrated on a systemic or
individual basis, cannot be entirely divorced from the threat of concrete violence. It cannot be
divorced from the epidemic of social exclusion or the gatekeeping practices that run rampant in
the social, medical, and legal realms and have the effect of jeopardizing the welfare, and the very
lives, of trans women – especially trans women of color, who inhabit multiply marginalized
identities – and the communities of which they are a part.
While it may be plainly evident at this point that individuals ought to be afforded ethical
authority over their identities, it is important to remember that such a claim operates in a register
distinct from the register of ontology. This is consequential because, in the realm of “oppression
theory,” according to Lugones (1990), “[t]he ontological or metaphysical possibility of liberation
remains to be argued” (p. 502). One way to accomplish “the ontological possibility of
liberation,” she suggests promisingly, is through the embracement of ontological pluralism
(1990, p. 502). I therefore claim that through by highlighting the liberatory potentiality of
ontological pluralism at the same time as we embrace the idea that everyone possesses absolute
ethical authority over his or her identity, it is not only possible to construct a philosophically
robust notion of gender that is both inclusive and multiplicitous, but also to clear a path toward
liberation from the systemic form of oppression we call transphobia.

7

7.1

Conclusion

Embracing Diverse Trans Temporalities
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Kadji Amin (2014) asserts, in his keyword contribution to the inaugural issue of TSQ:
Transgender Studies Quarterly, that “transgender experiences are constituted by yet
[simultaneously] exceed normative temporalities” (p. 219). Paradoxically, nonnormative
experiences of gender are partially constituted by the normative temporal paradigm in which
they are forced to exist, even if such constrained modes of gendered existence are often figured
as illegible, unimaginable, even unlivable. Queerness and transness hang suspended in
paralogous states of constitutive abjection beneath Western culture’s hegemonically constructed
ideals of sexuality and gender, namely heteronormativity and cisnormativity. Because of the
current dominant status of heterosexuality and cissexuality, trans and queer instantiations of
difference are relentlessly pathologized. Far from being a necessary reality, however, this
situation is but a second order addition to external behaviours and traits which, we have been
conditioned to believe, variously reflect our internal embodied experiences of gender.
Thus, the potential for the reversal of gender and sexual norms is always already
guaranteed by the very fact of their prior constitution by historically contingent structures of
power; it is, counterintuitively, precisely the presumed inviolability of such norms which exposes
them as fallible – as modifiable and not immutable. If heterosexuality and cissexuality were in
fact natural and original – whether biologically given or metaphysically innate – society would
have no need of endorsing the array of coercive and regulatory norms and injunctions with which
we find ourselves inundated to secure the maintenance of such norms and to ensure widespread
conformity to normative sexual and gendered behaviours.
With specific respect to temporality, it is precisely the inescapable fact of the imaginary,
phantasmatic constitution of gender normative experiences of time as natural which implies the
ineradicable possibility of deviance and/or nonconformity by means of gender variant
experience; sexual and gendered deviation(s) are indispensable to dominant homophobic and
transphobic sociocultural regimes insofar as the constructed norms of heteronormativity and
cisnormativity would have no coherence without them, and without the dominant notion of time
figured as progressive linearity, along with this “heterosexual” notion of temporality’s attendant
set of acceptable, ideologically imbued ways of relating to the past, the future, and the present. In
short, the naturalization of heterotemporality implies its porosity to processes of denaturalization,
or rather, queering.
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Trans temporalities often exceed the limitations of both the ‘wrong body’ and ‘beyond
the binary’ models of transgender experience, relegating transness to a perpetual state of
ambiguity which can lead to its designation as a culturally illegible form of pathological
difference recalcitrant to straightforward classification. However, the pathologizing effects of
dominant gender norms can only be sustained as long the inherent ambiguity at the heart of the
discursive categories of gender and sex remains concealed and/or disavowed through the
construction of cisgender, heterosexual identification as a natural and original norm predicated
on the exclusion and disavowal of gender and sexual nonconformity.
In a related vein, Bettcher’s reconsideration of trans oppression and resistance benefits
from her sharp awareness of the ontological tension between flexibility and rigidity, a tension
which transcends the already fragile division between transfeminist theory and trans politics. The
epistemological uncertainty with respect to the true nature of gender nonconformity continues to
haunt the field of queer and feminist theoretical discourse due to the insurmountable existence of
a mutually exclusive dichotomy between the “beyond the binary” model of transgender
experience, criticized for its “alleged commitment to the [problematic] view that gender is a
mere cultural construction” and the apparent metaphysical essentialism of the (trapped in the)
“wrong body” model (Bettcher, 2014, p. 385). Although it may be justifiably asserted that the
coexistence of these two opposing perspectives leads to an irresolvable epistemological
deadlock, however, it can also crucially be rearticulated as a generative of a productive form of
ambiguity. Like many trans and queer individuals in reality, Maria Griffiths, the protagonist of
Imogen Binnie’s (2013) Nevada, spends a great deal of time pondering the socially aleatory or
marginalizing implications of the ontological identity she inhabits. Although the potential for
uncertainty, introspection, and even dysphoria (due to the radical potential of trans temporalities
to break with cis temporality) of nonnormative gendered experience is troublingly vulnerable to
pathologization, it is also loaded with productive potentiality. Indeed, the apparent disjunct
between heterotemporality and queer temporalities is especially relevant in current cultural
climates in which trans people are disproportionately forced to navigate a hostile heterosexual
matrix bound up with structures of power which place a premium on the heterosexualized
temporality of linear progression, masculinized psychosexual development, and reproductive
futurity.
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As I have showcased, Israeli-Nevo convincingly argues that “as trans subjects in this
transphobic world, we are encouraged and forced into a position of not being present” (emphasis
mine). Therefore, presence, though it is certainly not inherently queer nor is it the only queer
modality of temporal experience, can be both a valuable tool in the struggle to resist cis
temporality in that its mobilization as a (queer) alternative to hegemonic temporalities which
does not tend toward becoming a hegemonic imperative itself. If treated with care, the concept of
taking one’s time poses little danger of mutating into a totalizing force, unlike the paradigm of
fluidity which threatens to unwittingly recapitulate the normativizing tendencies of precisely the
paradigm it is meant to resist. By making room for the liminality of transition, Israeli-Nevo
opens a horizon of alternative possibilities to “classic” conceptualizations of trans temporality
without discounting the value of narratives which do conform to normative expectations – such
as Caitlyn Jenner’s highly publicized and chronologically progressive transition narrative.
Importantly, Israeli-Nevo makes no claims to universalize the concept of taking time, nor to
prescribe it as an ethical imperative, acknowledging that trans people can be forced into delaying
the process of somatic transition due to structural inequalities and that her privileged position
allows her to take her time in ways that others cannot. Israeli-Nevo’s article takes a uniquely
egalitarian approach to the phenomenon of gender transitioning insofar as it wages a powerful
critique of linear progression which nevertheless leaves intact more conventional modes of being
in time and ontological becoming including narratives of aspirational transition in which one
deliberately seeks to transition as quickly and “completely” as possible, namely enterprises of
transsexual crossing aimed at passing as distinctly and inflexibly male or female.
Furthermore, the embracement of liminality through the template of taking one’s time
need not and does not inadvertently function to hierarchically displace or pathologize more rigid
narratives and/or experiences of trans temporality (such as the classic of linearly progressive and
fully complete transition exemplified by Caitlyn Jenner). Therefore, the concept of taking time
represents an attractive alternative to the model of fluidity insofar as the former opens up the
option to remain for a time (either temporarily or indefinitely) in a state of fluid ambiguity if one
so chooses but stops short of inscribing such inclinations as imperative or as prerequisite to the
assumption of a transgender identity or other queer mode(s) of identification. On the one hand,
the common conservative view of gender operates, unsurprisingly, in sync with the cissexist and
transphobic disciplinary regulation and enforcement of gender norms enacted and sustained by
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heteropatriarchal, capitalist structures of power. On the other hand, purportedly progressive
liberal assimilationist gay rights discourses subtly collude with heteronormative regimes of
power to invent contrived and (inadvertently?) homogenizing models of trans identity and gender
performance which elide the diverse actuality of trans experience. For Lee Edelman, both
conservative and liberal politics are likewise invested in the logic of reproductive futurity which
underpins all political discourse: in his polemic text No Future: Queer Theory and the Death
Drive, he diagnoses “every political vision as a vision of futurity,” arguing that, within the
current paradigm of oppositional queer politics, “the only queerness that queer sexualities could
ever hope to claim would spring from their determined opposition to this underlying structure of
the political” (Edelman, 2004, p. 291).
Amidst the universal consensus in the political sphere regarding the value of reproduction
and futurity posited by Edelman (2004), I claim, trans identity is locked into a problematic
double bind: from the conservative standpoint, a false dichotomy is manufactured in which
transness, like homosexuality, must either be eradicated or assimilated to preserve the social
order, while from a radically progressive or liberal standpoint it perpetuates the imaginary
preponderance of an idealized transnormative subject eager to disavow his or her past, a subject
for whom transition is always aspirational, complete, and irreversible, a subject who always
looks forward, never backward. As such, the disproportionate attention afforded to “classic”
transition narratives in media coverage and popular culture, reinforces the totalizing influence of
a singular ideal of transfemininity rigidly oriented toward the anatomical and physiological
approximation of normative femininity.
Diversity and dissensus within the vast and richly multiplicitous field of trans(sexual)
narratives, however, productively threatens to de-naturalize, as it were, this ironically protohegemonic model of nonnormative transgender/nonbinary temporality, to challenge its absolute
primacy and its ability to represent all trans people, especially transsexual persons. As long as
even a minority of individuals resist subsumption by such an ideal and refuse to subscribe to the
fantasy of its supposedly universal applicability, there will still always be ruptures to be
exploited by those who so choose in the straightforward temporal fabric of linear progression,
but at the same time, the “classic” trajectory will not (and must not) be forcibly foreclosed to
those who currently derive fulfilment and empowerment from it.
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7.2

The Vital Force of Self-Identification

In “From Duration to Self-Identification? The Temporal Politics of the California Gender
Recognition Act,” published in Transgender Studies Quarterly (TSQ), Marie Draz (2019)
prefaces her investigation of the agonistic interplay between nonnormative gender identification
and state legislative policy by acknowledging that trans and genderqueer experiences of time can
appear to “emerge against a backdrop of a normative temporality in which gender identity is
understood as a single discoverable thread moving from a knowable past to a knowable future”
(p. 593). Arguing that “temporality is a generative framework” rather than an inherently
restrictive one, she speculates about the possibility of a general social and cultural shift towards
the recognition of identity – both gender identity and the historically rigidly biologized category
of ‘sex’ – “grounded in self-identification rather than duration” (Draz, 2019, p. 595). In her
estimation, recent developments in North American legislative policy such as the 2017
California Gender Recognition Act (CGRA) “[appear] to open trans futures, and multiple
temporalities of gender more broadly, rather than insist that a particular temporal model must
legitimate all trans identity” (Draz, 2019, p. 595). With this line, Draz (2019) implicitly testifies
that, in regards to both the social management and personal navigation of gender, we need not
absolutely privilege or insist upon ubiquitous conformity to one particular temporal model,
namely the historico-culturally dominant linear model of time known as “straight time” in many
contemporary queer theoretical discourses on temporality. The “logic of duration” (Draz, 2019,
596) traditionally favored in Western culture and employed in service of state-sanctioned
programs of social organization and control, is not only logically incoherent but pragmatically
impotent in its outmoded/outdated capacity as the silent and invisible guardian-and-enforcer of
the prescriptive sociocultural norm of cisnormativity.
Rather, it seems possible, and indeed logically evident, that a potentially infinite plurality
of personally specific and highly diverse, experientially grounded/informed conceptual models
of ‘temporality’ may coexist alongside a multiplicity of identities/gendered ways of identifying.
This would also inevitably imply the existence of a myriad of corresponding and conflictual
relations between an infinitely various array of experiences/models of time and a similarly
unlimited array of categories of identity and modes of identification. Such an insight is at once
especially applicable in a logical sense to the nonnormative timelines of trans and gender variant
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narratives of identification and intimately relevant in a phenomenological sense to the everyday
experience of those forced to navigate a paradigm of temporality (‘straight time’) at odds with
their own divergent lived experience of time.
Draz’s (2019) article orbits around the central theme of the relation between time and
identity. She demonstrates beautifully how the contested nature of that conceptual relation
becomes problematic when one realizes that, in the context of “the larger relationship between
time and state practices,” it is precisely a lack of change, “or the duration of an identity across
time, that is often used to justify the legitimacy of a marginalized identity” (Draz, 2019, p. 597).
The socio-juridical preoccupation with ‘duration’ in the context of gender corresponds, moreover
and more specifically, to a corollary fixation on the length of time that one has been, and/or
known themselves to be, in possession of a ‘male,’ ‘female,’ or otherwise gendered core self. To
this end, legally sanctioned changes to the type of sex marker recorded on an official document
are often accompanied by the explicit expectation that for such an administrative amendment to
occur, the gender or sex listed on the amended document must not only be supported by the
individual testimony of the person to whom it belongs but additionally legitimated by medical
and/or psychiatric “testimony about the legitimacy of such a claim” (Draz, 2019, p. 596).
In a sociocultural paradigm in which gender identity is taken to be permanent and
unchanging from birth until death, nonnormative gender identities may seem durationally
irregular and those who occupy them coerced into striving toward the durational extreme of
permanence with respect to their identity as one gender or the/an-other. Whereas the idealized
status of “authenticity” is afforded to cis subjects without question, instances of nonnormative
gender identification are only deemed legitimate on the basis of their verifiable alignment with
the ideal of permanence, a fact “proven” (or disproven) by the presence of sufficient evidence
that one will not change his or her mind in the future and has not changed it too frequently or at
all in the past. Indeed, according to Draz, the medicalized social and legal emphasis on duration
has “shifted [in recent years] to focus more explicitly on the permanence of an identity” (p. 596).
Ideally, according to the dominant model of the interaction between personal identity and time in
which the former is presumed to maintain a strictly coextensive relationship to the latter and vice
versa, one’s gender identity should stretch all the way back to one’s earliest memory, with no
gaps or moments of uncertainty plaguing the narrative. In other words one’s lived experience
should mirror and reinforce the ‘born this way’ ontological narrative in which one is always
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already assumed to have been in possession of a permanent, immutable, and unchanging gender
identity, one that either straightforwardly aligns with or conflicts with the sex s/he was assigned
at birth.
Legal documentation undeniably serves a “promissory” function, binding the “document
holder” to a linear orientation both to their own personal future and to the very notion of futurity
itself (Draz, 2019, p. 597). Thus, the moment one is granted approval by the state to alter the way
a given document represents one’s gender identity or sex, the gendered subject is catapulted into
a presumptive relationship to time that is not necessarily her own; for in reality the temporality of
gender is not always or necessarily static, immutable, or concretely or straightforwardly
comprehensible or coherent, but can also, alternatively or simultaneously, be erratic, evanescent,
shifting, multiplicitous, schizophrenic, even provisional, even if it returns to stasis after a period
of rupture. Thus, simply opting to define gender as self-identification instead of duration is not
alone sufficient to assuage the deeply rooted normativizing effects of the socioculturally
established relation between identity and time on a fundamental level; the underlying fixity of
this relation, in which temporality-as-linear-progression dictates and circumscribes the
conditions in which identity must exist, thus forcing the latter to operate and appear legible in
only one limited and specific way, namely as an unchanging entity reliant upon its possession of
a stable past. Draz (2019) suggests that, beginning in the late twentieth century, the normative
and binary conceptual paradigm undergirding the state-administration of gender in Western
society has begun adapting to the possibility that gender is not always perfectly commensurable
with a model of continuous duration.
However, “even when changes are granted to [state] policies,” she asserts, “the
underlying view of time and identity has often remained untouched” (Draz, 2019, p. 596). It is
precisely this “underlying view of time and identity,” the one privileged by Western culture in
which time is portrayed as progressive linearity and identity is portrayed as static, unchanging,
and always oriented toward a knowable future) to which María Lugones’ (1990) notion of
“ontological pluralism” (p. 502) poses a considerable challenge. For society to afford sexed
subjects the freedom not only to determine every aspect of their gender identity without
restriction, but also the possibility of identifying in multiple different ways at different times, in
different situations, or in different “worlds”—and of switching between these identities
seamlessly, not in the way that an actor might perform different roles but as a wholly natural and
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authentic way of being-in-the-world, at the appropriate time, or in the appropriate situation or
“world” (even if one’s ontological status in one “world” directly conflicts with her status in
another)—society must adjust its fundamental conceptions of both time and identity and the
underlying relation between the two.
We should attempt to shift away, I claim, from a strictly chrononormative conception of
temporality and toward a more pluralistic understanding of subjective time – away from the
static and singularizing traditional approach to ontology which informs our strictly unitary model
of gendered personal identity toward an embracement of ontological and identificatory pluralism.
Only then will we achieve radical inclusivity and begin to unconditionally accept the infinite
potentiality of gender variability as a principle inherent in humanity, allowing us to become
equally accepting of cis, trans, and nonbinary ways of being. In other words, we must depart
from the established normative models of time-as-linear-progression and identity-as-static-andimmutable in order to afford intelligibility and dignity to individuals whose experiences of
gender, whose narratives and ontologies, confound normative assumptions and conflict with
normative standards.
One crucial step María Lugones takes in this direction is to flatly reject the assumption of
unified subjectivity. “I am giving up the idea of a unified subject”, she declares in
“Structure/Antistructure and Agency Under Oppression” (Lugones, 1990, p. 503). And in
“Playfulness, World-Travelling, and Loving Perception”: “One does not experience an
underlying ‘I’” (Lugones, 1987, p. 12). She detaches herself from and remains radically
uncommitted, in other words, to the traditional notion of a “transcendental self” (Lugones, 1990,
p. 506), the stable, unified entity that supposedly lies beneath or behind one’s outward identity or
identities, or the “doer behind the deed” in Butlerian/Nietzschean terms. While she admits that
her phenomenological conceptualization of identification might be seen in some sense as
“ontologically problematic,” she suggests that “any account of identity that could not be true to
[the] experience of outsiders to the mainstream would be faulty even if ontologically
unproblematic” (Lugones, 1987, p. 11). Yet the ethical dilemma of ensuring control over
gendered individuals’ own identities persists; individuals must be afforded the freedom to
identify how they wish lest the ideal of the highest possible degree of agency and freedom with
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regard to the existential project of self-determination, from which no human being should be
exempt or disqualified, be compromised.45
The notion that someone whose experience of gender conflicts with the gender identity
assigned to them at birth, or who may possess bodily features commonly associated with the
gender or sex opposite to or other than their felt gender or sex, should only transition if, should
only live openly as a member of the sex category to which they know they belong if they “truly”
are (and preferably have always known, or at minimum have known for a long enough duration
of time) that they are really a member of that sex, undermines the validity of transgender identity
on the whole and discounts the fact that trans identities are equally as valid as their normative
counterparts, namely cisgender identities. The logic of truth or falsity, the notion of
‘verifiability,’ and the fallacious absolutism of empiricist verificationism are irrelevant and
immaterial to the validity and authenticity of one’s avowed identity. As Marie Draz (2019)
makes clear, shifting our understanding of gender as primarily an act of self-identification –
“Gender as Self-Identification” (p. 598) – as opposed to viewing it as reducible to duration
doesn’t fully resolve the problems of “Gender as Duration” (p. 595). For even if it is conceded
that one should have the authority to determine his or her gender identity the underlying
conception of temporality as a linear progression from past to present to future which reinforces
the cultural expectation that the nature of an individual’s identity be static and immutable,
remains unchallenged; the assumption is never compromised that one’s gender identity must be
determined once and for all, such that the avowal of a new way of identifying can never coexist
with a previous way of identifying but should be seen as completely and permanently
delegitimizing any past assessment of sex or gender identity attributed to or avowed by the
subject.

7.3

Ontological and Temporal Diversity Contra

Chrononormativity and the Injunction to Be Flexible

Hence, Talia Mae Bettcher’s (2014) model of FPA is not an ontological authority but an ethical
authority.
45
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At this late stage of our investigation I think we are prepared to ask: what effect might the
embracement of dominant gender terms as a source of empowerment as opposed to an obstacle
to liberation have on the much-celebrated notion of queer subversion? Should ‘subversion’ be
defined solely on the basis of an opposing or antagonistic relation to heteronormativity and
hetero/cis-temporality, or can the concept be reimagined in a more expansive light – rearticulated
in a way that accounts for the plethora of possible ways of interacting with the universal features
of human experience known as temporality and embodiment? Can it be deemed subversive not
only to subvert expectations but to “take one’s time,” as Israeli-Nevo puts it, in fulfilling
precisely such (“normative”) expectations – to linger in the uncertainty and indeterminacy of a
present in which one has not yet fully “completed” the highly personal process of transitioning?
How might queerly subversive formulations of transgender identity inadvertently displace or
further marginalize forcibly non-normativized subjects who do not find unmitigated value in the
“subversion of identity”46 but instead wish to occupy a gendered subject position that is either
normative (i.e. heterosexual female or male) or conventionally queer (i.e. lesbian female, gay
male, or bisexual male or female)?
We are now well familiar with Bettcher’s (2014) exposition of the politically charged
disjunct between two disparate metaphysical models of transness – the “wrong-body” model and
“beyond-the-binary” model – as a consequence of which some transsexual subjects “see
themselves as nonconsensually subsumed under the transgender umbrella” (p. 385). With this
nuanced point of concern in mind, I wish to elaborate upon an insight voiced by Jack Halberstam
(2007), who opines that “the emphasis within contemporary subcultures on
‘flexibility’…ascribes mobility over time to some notion of liberation and casts stubborn
identification as a way of being stuck in time, unevolved, not versatile” (Dinshaw et al, 2007, p.
190).47 To what extent might binary transsexuality be susceptible to being stereotypically
portrayed as an instantiation of just such a “stubborn” mode of identification? From an ethical
perspective, if we are to claim to have even the slightest regard for ontological agency, we
cannot afford to allow individuals or their identities to be hierarchized on the basis of their

As evoked by the latter half of the title of Judith Butler’s seminal text, Gender Trouble: Feminism and
the Subversion of Identity.
47
The expression of this statement occurred in the context of a virtual roundtable discussion edited by
Elizabeth Freeman and published as part of a special issue on queer temporalities in GLQ: A Journal of
Lesbian and Gay Studies. See Dinshaw et al (2007).
46
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amenability to the subversion or transgression of normative boundaries. Nor can we condone, in
good conscience, the tendency to unilaterally conflate immobility or inflexibility with
“stubbornness.” Individuals who refuse, for whatever reason, to adhere to a specific blueprint of
“subversion” or resistance, deserve to be regarded with greater consideration and respect.
Given the skewed emphasis on fluidity and subversion to which Halberstam alludes, the
comparatively straightforward and inflexible desire to transition from male-to-female or femaleto-male cannot escape the possibility of being viewed symptomatically as resulting from a
pathologized internalization of gender normativity on the part of the transsexual subject. We
ignore the liberatory power of unbridled self-determination at our own philosophical and social
peril. Though it may seem counterintuitive to some, we cannot treat conformity to the idealized
traits commonly associated with cissexuality as counterrevolutionary. We cannot view acts or
identities that may appear to reinforce or reinscribe ‘normativity’ as necessarily indicative of an
uncritical subscription to the belief that gender identity must fall statically and inflexibly on one
side of the gender binary or the other.
In defense of less-obviously-subversive forms of gendered embodiment, I therefore wish
to challenge the exclusionary tendency to valorize sexual and gendered fluidity or flexibility over
and against other non-hegemonic or non-normative ways of embodying gender. We must not
allow ourselves to become too deeply entrenched within the parochial ethos of a specific
historical model of queer subversion that, if it has not outlived its usefulness, remains inadequate
to the experiences of the most marginalized and targeted sexed subjects. The simple reality is
that neither subversion nor conformity is preferable in and of itself. Neither fluidity nor stasis can
be deemed preferable in and of itself. Herein lies the heart of the tension at play between an antinormative queer paradigm that valorizes acts and modes of identification which it perceives as
“queerly subversive,” and transsexuals who lay no claim to “nonnormativity” but who routinely
come up against significant barriers to being accepted as “normal,” or, for that matter, “real,”
within a trans-resistant society. The queer or homosexual transgression of heteronormativity,
while important and potentially liberatory, reproduces a hetero/homo binary pertaining to
sexuality specifically that leaves transsexual subjects who both wish to be viewed definitively as
men or women and desire the opposite sex without a stable place in queer theoretical discourse;
queer theory has failed, in other words, to construct an adequate framework in which to elaborate
the unique relationship between transsexuality and sexual and gender hegemony.
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Unsurprisingly, Butler (1993) appears to fall victim to precisely such an uncritical
valorization of queer subversion to the exclusion of the possibility of unrestricted gender
diversity in Bodies That Matter, the follow up to her massively influential Gender Trouble. This
is most readily apparent in her portrayal of Venus Xtravaganza, a Latina transsexual among a
group of drag queens portrayed in the documentary Paris Is Burning, to whom she attributes the
desire for a “transubstantiation of gender” (p. 89). Butler’s (1993) portrayal of Venus’ “fantasy”
foregrounds the fact that Xtravaganza does not simply wish to perform her femininity freely but
to become “real” – to thoroughly and authentically assume an embodied subject position other
than the one to which she currently has access; and it is clear that for Venus, this would have
entailed “both achieving coherent sexed embodiment and middle-class security” (Prosser, 1998,
p. 81). In Jay Prosser’s (1998) estimation, Butler (1993) perpetrates a twofold presupposition
with respect to the general relationship between transsexuality and gender realness. Firstly, she
assumes that “inherent to doing realness is an agency resistant to and transformative of
hegemonic constraint that the desire to be real lacks; and following this, that the transsexual’s
crossing signifies a failure to be subversive and transgressive of hegemonic constraint where it
ought to be” (Prosser, 1998, p. 82). Against the monolithic trend of fluidity, which arguably has
the potential to become a dominant script in its own right48, I argue that we must refrain from
valorizing one specific model of queer subversion at the expense of sexual and gender identities
and modes of being which cannot be characterized as fluid or flexible and do not
straightforwardly disrupt the dominant paradigm of gender normativity, and therefore may be in
danger of being seen as not “queer enough.”
While it is tempting to make the reductive claim that queerness is fundamentally
incommensurable with the linearly progressive, chrono-normative, nature of heterosexual
temporality, the truly revolutionary potentiality of queer temporalities is rooted, I claim, in
queerness’ general “refusal to submit to a temporal logic” (Dinshaw et al, 2007, p. 188);
likewise, trans temporalities are not bound or obligated to any specific or singular temporal logic.
We must begin to recognize, as individuals and as a society, that any and every way of

48

I want to stress here that while I categorically resist universalization and normativization with respect to
human experience or identity, I do not seek to discount the viability or validity of nondichotomous/dualistic forms of gender expression. Rather, I advocate for a position of sustained dissensus
within gender theory and trans feminism whereby all identities are equally valued regardless of the
theoretical positions they might appear to implicitly reinforce or negate.
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narrativizing the complex internal interplay between temporality and gender should be viewed as
valid avenue to human flourishing. Trans narratives have no more obligation to adhere to a
nondominant, or queerly subversive model of temporality than they do to adhere to the currently
dominant teleological model of temporality – i.e. chrononormativity – which undergirds both
heterosexual time or “hetero-temporality” and cis normative time (or “cis-temporality”?). Trans
men and women as well as nonbinary individuals should be under no obligation to pledge
allegiance to any one temporal or ontological model of gendered existence.
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